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THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: THE EIGHTH SESSION (1979)
By Bernard H. Oxman *
I. INTRODUCrION
The eighth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea met in Geneva from March 19 to April 27, 1979. It resumed in
New York from July 16 to August 24, 1979, with the first three days devoted
to informal consultations.'
Intensive substantive work on major outstanding issues began on the first
day and continued, almost without interruption, throughout both parts of
the session. The fruits of these labors are recorded in a revision of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT/Rev.1) issued following the
last plenary meeting in Geneva,'2 and in texts contained in reports of the
relevant chairmen presented at the close of the session in New York.' At
Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. United States
Representative and Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation, and Chairman of the En-
glish Language Group of the Drafting Committee, at the eighth session of the Law of
the Sea Conference. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Department of State, the U.S. Government, or
the English Language Group or Drafting Committee of the conference.
' This article is a sequel to Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the
Sea Conference, 68 AJIL 1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AJIL 1 (1975);-The 1975
Geneva Session, 69 AJIL 763 (1975); and Oxman, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session, 71 AJIL 247
(1977);-The 1977 New York Sessions, 72 AJIL 57 (1978);-The Seventh Session
(1978), 73 AJIL 1 (1979).
!'UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (April 28, 1979), reprinted in 18 ILM 686
(1979). For discussions of the regime of straits under the revised ICNT, see the
articles by W. Michael Reisman and John Norton Moore, infra at pp. 48 and 77,
respectively. Professor Moore's analysis is consistent with the author's recollections
and previous articles, and should put the matter to rest.
3 The Official Records of the conference (hereinafter cited as OFF. REc.) for the
eighth session were not available at the time of preparation of this article. Reports to
the Plenary of the Conference, UN DOC. A/CONF.62/91 (Sept. 19, 1979) and Corr.1
(Oct. 15, 1979), includes all of the following: Report of the General Committee as ap-
proved by the Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/88 (Aug. 24, 1979) at 3; Report to
the Plenary by the Chairman of the First Committee, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/LA3 (Aug.
29, 1979) at 8; Report on Negotiations held by the Chairman and the Co-ordinators of
the Working Group of 21, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.26 (Aug. 21, 1979) at 16 [here-
inafter cited as WG21 report] (the chairman and coordinators are respectively the chair-
man of the First Committee and the chairmen of Negotiating Groups 1 and 2; the Report
of the Chairman of the Group of Legal Experts on the Settlement of Disputes Relating
to Part XI is included in App. B at 64); Report to the Plenary Conference by the
Chairman of the Second Committee, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.42 (Aug. 24, 1979) at 70,
including a summary of his report on Negotiating Group 6, Conf. Doc. NG6/19 (Aug.
22, 1979); Report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, Conf. Doc. NG7/45 (Aug.
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that time the conference adopted a work plan for the ninth session which
anticipates completing the informal proceedings, adopting a formal text,
and concluding formal proceedings on that text.4  The session is scheduled
to meet in the spring and summer of 1980.
The difficult, at times painful, and frequently thankless task of confront-
ing and resolving outstanding issues in detail, one by one, in myriad groups,
has advanced to a degree not fully appreciated. A "package" that emerges
in this way stirs little drama, at least until the combined impact is suddenly
perceived, as happened in the closing hours at Geneva when the confer-
ence debated the revisions to the ICNT presented by the chairmen. Yet
the determination to succeed evident in this work, more than any rhetorical
manifestation of that determination, provides the substantive foundation
for the optimistic timetable adopted for the ninth session.
The work of the conference has, of course, been cumulative. The eighth
session in particular is best understood by reference to the orge.nization of
work of the preceding session,5 where seven negotiating groups on outstand-
ing hardcore issues were appointed.6 At the seventh session the conference
decided that revisions in the Informal Composite Negotiating Test (ICNT) 7
should not be introduced on the initiative of any single person... un-
less presented to the Plenary and found, from the widespread and sub-
stantial support prevailing in Plenary, to offer a substantially improved
prospect of a consensus. The revision . . . should be the collective re-
sponsibility of the President and the Chairmen of the main committees,
acting together as a team headed by the President. The Chairman of
the Drafting Committee and the Rapporteur-General should be as-
sociated with the team .... 8
While the ICNT was not revised at the seventh session, new texts were
presented in reports by the chairmen of the main committees and negotiating
groups.9 Moreover, most of the substantive articles that were not assigned
22, 1979) at 116; Report by the Chairman of the Third Committee, UN Doc. A/CONF.
62/L.41 (Aug. 23, 1979) at 75; Report of the President of the Conference on the
Work of the Informal Plenary on Final Clauses, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.,14 (Aug. 27,
1979) at 125; Report by the Chairman of the Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses,
Conf. Doc. FC/16 (Aug. 23, 1979) at 121; Report of the President of the Conference
on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the Settlement of Disputes, UN Doc. A/CONF.
62/L.45 (Aug. 29, 1979); Report to the Plenary by the Chairman of the Drafting Corn-
mittee, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.40 (Aug. 22, 1979) at 81. The documents of the
eighth session are reproduced in English in DOKUMENTE DE DIUTrEN SEEIIECHTSKON-
FERENZ DER VEREINTEN NATiONEN-GENFER SESSION 1979 (ed. Platz6der, Munich:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1979, 3 vols., SWP-M2128/I-III),-NE~v
Yom-n SESSION 1979 (Oct. 1979, 2 vols., SWP-M2291/I-II).
4 Report of the General Committee, note 3 supra, at 3.
5 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (April 13, 1978), 10 OFF. tEC. 6 (1978); see Oxman, The
Seventh Session, note I supra, at 3-5.
GText of para. 11(5) of UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62, note 5 supra, reproduced in 73
AJIL 5 n.14 (1979).
7UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (July 15, 1977) and Add.1 (July 22, 1977), 8 Ov.
REc. 1 (1978), reprinted in 16 ILM 1108 (1977).
s UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62, note 5 supra, pt. II, paras. 10 and 11.
9UN Doc. A/CONF.62/RCNG/1 and 2, 10 OFF. REC. 13, 126 (1978) see Oxman,
The Seventh Session, note 1 supra, 73 AJIL 1 (1979) passim.
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to negotiating groups were subjected to, and survived, an article-by-article
review in the Second Committee.
The eighth session began where the seventh left off, with the benefit
of additional reflection and discussion during the intervening period. It
based its work on the procedures already agreed, together with additional
procedural innovations on matters dealt with by the First Committee.
Substantive matters tentatively agreed at the seventh session or before
were largely left alone. On deep seabed mining in particular, the con-
ference faced up to, and in effect rejected, attempts either to reopen
issues long since settled or to revert to the kind of ideological debate char-
acteristic of its early sessions. This attitude is significant evidence of a
desire to do the work necessary to conclude the negotiations, particularly
because there were new members on some delegations who might have
been sympathetic to reopening issues on which they had not worked
themselves.
Results of the Session
The substantive results of the eighth session can be divided into four
categories.
First, those texts substantially completed and submitted in the chair-
men's reports at the seventh session were incorporated into the ICNT/
Rev.1. Thus, the ICNT/Rev.1 generally records the completion of in-
formal negotiations on these matters, subject of course to discussion of
drafting questions, including problems of conformity of texts.
This category includes the texts prepared in Negotiating Group 4 on
access of landlocked states and "states with special geographical charac-
teristics" to surplus fisheries of the economic zones of their neighbors,'0
the amendments prepared in Negotiating Group 5 on settlement of dis-
putes with respect to fisheries," an amendment on anadromous species
prepared by the Second Committee,12 the substantial amendments prepared
by the Third Committee on protection and preservation of the marine
environment,1 3 and its amendments to Part XIV, "Development and Trans-
fer of Marine Technology," 14 and a drafting correction proposed by Nego-
lo ICNT/Rev.1, Arts. 62, 69, and 70. Negotiating Group 4 Reports at 10 OFF. REC.
88-95, 166-67 are discussed by the author in 73 AJIL at pp. 16-18.
11 ICNT/Rev.1, Arts. 296(1) and (3) and 297. Negotiating Group 5 Reports at 10
OFF. REC. 117-23, 168-69 are discussed by the author in 73 AJIL at pp. 18-19.
1z ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 66. Second Committee Report, para. 13, 10 OFF. REc. 85-86.
13ICNT/Rev.1, Arts. 1(5), 194(5), 210(5), 211(1), (3), (4) and (7), 212(1),
220(2), (5) and (6), 221, 226, 230, and 235. The last of these was prepared at the
eighth session. Third Committee Reports on part XII at 10 OFF. REc. 96-115, 173-97
are discussed by the author in 73 AJIL at pp. 24-27.
14 In his report at the end of the eighth session, the chairman of the Third Committee
repeats the conclusion that "the substantive negotiations on Part XII (Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment) and Part XIV (Development and Transfer of
Marine Technology) could be considered as completed." UN Doe. A/CONF.62/L.41,
note 3 supra. The use of the term "substantive negotiations" presumably reflects the
fact that these texts will need to be harmonized with relevant First Committee and
1980]
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tHating Group 7 regarding delimitation of the territorial sea between states
with opposite or adjacent coasts. 15 Internal cross-references in the ICNT/
Rev.1 are based on the relevant discussions of the Drafting Committee,
which reflect a general trend toward simplicity (e.g., use of "this Conven-
tion" rather than "the present Convention")."
Second, the ICNT/Rev.1 contains new texts prepared at the eighth
session, although based in part on the work of the seventh session. The
new texts, while presenting some problems that remain to be addressed,
in effect- either reflect agreements reached or provide a substantially ad-
vanced basis for agreement. This category includes the precise definition
of the limits of the continental shelf 1" and new rates of revenue sharing
from the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles,' 8 as well as
the many new provisions in part XI on deep seabed mining beyond the
limits of the continental shelf. The acceptability of these texts depends
to some extent on additional work on related matters.
Third, the reports issued at the end of the eighth session contain texts
that substantially resolve or provide the basis for resolving a number of
issues that remain in the ICNT/Rev.1. The most comprehensive is the
report dealing with deep seabed mining issues.'9 It includes proposed
amendments to the ICNT/Rev.1 on the system of exploration and exploita-
tion, the financial arrangements, the Assembly and Council of the Seabed
Authority, and the settlement of disputes. With some important excep-
tions such as voting in the Council, the new texts mark a substantial ad-
vance toward final agreement on deep seabed mining.
The report of the chairman of the Third Committee 2 0 on marine scien-
tific research also falls in this category. It contains amendments to the
ICNT/Rev.1 that resulted fr6m intensive negotiations. While some draft-
ing work remains, issuance of these texts largely brings the difficult sub-
stantive negotiations on this matter to a close.
While the report of the Second Committee-' is cautious, two matters
referred to in it belong in the third category. In New York, the com-
mittee accepted an amendment negotiated among concerned delegations
that was designed to eliminate a problem created by the the introduction
of an amendment into the ICNT/Rev.1 regarding suspension of innocent
passage.2" An amendment on protection of marine mammals also nego-
Second Committee texts and perhaps redrafted in some respects by the Drafting Com-
mittee, which may not undertake substantive negotiations. Rules of Procedure, rule 53,
UN Doe. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.2.
15 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 15. See Negotiating Group 7 Report at 10 OFF. REc. 124.
16 Drafting Committee Informal Paper 1/Rev.1/Add.2 (Aug. 31, 1979); see Report
by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.39 (June 15,
1979), 10 OFF. REc. 199, and ICNT/Rev.1 (explanatory memorandum).
17 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 76. 18 Id., Art. 82(2).
19 WG21 report, note 3 supra. 20 Note 3 supra.
21 Ibid.
22 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 25, pursuant to a Belgian proposal designed to deal with ar-
tillery exercises of the coastal state, added protection for the safety of ships as a per-
missible basis for costal state suspension of innocent passage. The vagueness of this
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tiated among concerned delegations would seem to provide a basis for a
final draft.23  Similarly, Negotiating Group 7 reports substantial, albeit
conditional, agreement on a text dealing with provisional arrangements
and self-restraint pending delimitation of the economic zone or continental
shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.24
The most speculative use of the word "results" characterizes the fourth,
and final, category. With respect to deep seabed mining, negotiations
on the interim production limitation continued until the last day. The
"results," while not included in a report, would seem to provide a basis for
successful completion of consultations among the principal consumers and
producers of the metals involved. There was widespread support in the
Informal Plenary on Final Clauses for the establishment of a preparatory
commission to prepare necessary rules and regulations for deep seabed
mining, and to undertake other preparations for the Seabed Authority,
perhaps including arrangements for training. With respect to settlement
of disputes regarding delimitation between states with opposite or adja-
cent coasts, the view is now widely held that compulsory conciliation on
language proved objectionable. Previous texts provided for coastal state suspension only
where "essential for the protection of its security," based on the rule in the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, Art. 16, para. 3, 15 UST 1606,
TIAS No. 5639, 516 UNTS 205, reprinted in 52 AJIL 834 (1958). As a result of
consultations, the addition in the ICNT/Rev.1 would be replaced by adding the words
"including weapons exercises" of the coastal state after the reference to "its security."
2 The main purposes of the amendment are to avoid a possible misreading of the text
by making clear that Article 65 was never intended to permit less restrictive limitation
or regulation of the exploitation of marine mammals than would be required by the
convention if there were no such article, and to direct particular attention to the need
for appropriate organizational arrangements for the protection of cetaceans. Article 65
appears in Part V, "Exclusive Economic Zone," and is incorporated by reference by
Article 120 into Part VII, Section 2, "Management and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas." An examination of the amendment, superimposed on the
ICNT text of Article 65 by italicizing the additions and adding square brackets around
deletions, might prove illuminating in this context:
Nothing in this Part [Convention] restricts the right of a coastal State or the com-
petence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate
[regulate and limit] the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than providedfor in this Part. In this connexion, States shall cooperate [either directly or through
appropriate international organizations] with a view to the conservation [protection
and management] of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in par-
ticular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conserva-
tion, management and study.
The main question raised relates to the words, "In this connexion."
It should also be noted that the chairman of the Third Committee reported a con-
sensus on the understanding that the term "marine environment" includes marine life.
10 OFF. REc. 97 (1978). ICNT/Rev.I, Article 192 provides, "States have the obliga-
tion to protect and preserve the marine environment."
4 Note 3 supra. The amended text of Articles 74, paragraph 3 and 83, paragraph 3
would read:
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1 the States concerned, in a spirit
of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not tojeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall
be without preiudice to the final delimitation.
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some aspects, rather than arbitration or complete elimination of compulsory
third-party procedures on all aspects, represents the basis for accommoda-
tion both on the merits and because the negotiations on substantive de-
limitation principles are unlikely to yield a precise, definitive rule.
Outstanding Issues
As a result of these accomplishments, for the first time it is possible to
risk suggesting a list of major outstanding substantive issues for the ninth
session that is at once precise and comprehensive. Any such list proceeds
from the assumption that the hundreds of issues regarded as settled will
not be reopened, particularly during formal proceedings, and that remain-
ing "drafting" or "technical" problems-especially on deep seabed mining,
marine mammals, and marine scientific research-may take a litfle time to
resolve but will not become major issues. This being said, the list can be
divided into groups of issues as follows.
Deep Seabed Mining. The United States delegation, in its report on the
resumed eighth session, identified the following 13 items as the most im-
portant problems iremaining in the deep seabed mining provisions:
(1) Article 140: sharing of benefits with "peoples who -have not at-
tained full independence or other self-governing status";
(2) Article 150: making clear that the provisions on policies relating
to activities in the Area shall be implemented as specifically provided
in this part;
(3) Article 151: agreement on the numbers in the production ceiling;
(4) Article 155, paragraph 6: the moratorium;
(5) Article 161: voting in the Council (including Article 162, para-
graph 2(j) );
(6) Article 188: providing access to commercial arbitration for con-
tractual disputes;
(7) Annex II, Article 4: sponsorship where nationality and control
are separated;
(8) Annex II, Article 5 on technology transfer: the Brazil clause,2s
time limits, dispute settlement recourse for third-party owners, and
avoidance of warranty implications;
(9) Annex II, Article 7 on selection of applicants: the priority ac-
corded the Enterprise by paragraph 4;
(10) Annex II, Article 10 on joint arrangements: the failure to make
clear that they have the same security of tenure as other contracts;
(11) Annex II, Articles 10 or 11 on payments by the Enterprise: the
failure to state that the Enterprise is liable for the same payments as
the contractors, at least with respect to activities in nonreserved sites;
25 Annex II, Art. 5, para. I(e) imposes the same obligation to transfer tschnology to
a developing country applying for a mining contract as the obligation to transfer tech-
nology to the Enterprise.
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(12) Annex III, Article 10 on financing the Enterprise: the failure to
require that payments and guaranties be in convertible currencies; and
(13) Annex III, Article 12: tax immunity for the Enterprise. 26
The Continental Shelf. The remaining issues, while technical, are im-
portant to some of those principally concerned with the continental shelf
where it extends seaward of 200 miles from the coast:
( 1 ) ridges;
(2) Sri Lanka's proposal for a special approach to determining the
extent of its continental margin;
(3) the composition, functions, and procedures of the proposed Com-
mission on Limits of the Continental Shelf, including arrangements in
the event the coastal state has difficulty accepting the commission's
initial reactions to coastal state charts; and
(4) the exemption of developing coastal state importers from the
obligation to contribute revenues derived from continental shelf mineral
exploitation beyond 200 miles.
Delimitation of the Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Between
States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts. The major issues in this category
are:
(1) the substantive principles governing delimitation, including re-
lated matters such as the question of the right of a state to file a defini-
tive declaration of interpretation of these principles; and
(2) the scope of compulsory conciliation of delimitation disputes.
In addition to these items, the conference will now focus increasingly on
matters customarily left until the end, such as final clauses and drafting, on
which problems of substantive and political importance have already arisen.
At the eighth session, intensive work on final clauses was undertaken for
the first time. It is still too soon to tell how difficult the problems identi-
fied by the Informal Plenary on Final Clauses will prove, but some are
troublesome and could preclude agreement. They will be addressed
later in this article.
The Drafting Committee intensified its labors at the eighth session; it
issued its first set of recommendations on harmonization of texts 27 and is
preparing a second.8 The article-by-article review facing the Drafting
Committee and its Language Groups is an awesome task that will require a
great deal of time and effort, primarily because the provisions of the ICNT
were drafted by different people at different times using different models
26 U.S. Delegation Report, Resumed Eighth Session of the Third United Nations Con-
terence on the Law of the Sea, New York, July 16-August 24, 1979 (unpublished).
Other delegations, of course, might add some items to this list of deep seabed mining
issues. The French delegation, for example, is unhappy with the text of the so-called
antimonopoly clause (Annex I, Art. 6, para. 3(d)). Nevertheless, the U.S. delegation's
list is indicative of the nature and extent of the remaining problems.
'7 Note 3 supra.
21 It deals with Drafting Committee Informal Paper 2/Add.1.
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under different circumstances. They enjoyed neither the stable and limited
composition nor the traditional use of a special rapporteur that characterize
the International Law Commission (though at times they copied texts from
the 1958 conventions). The most controversial and important provisions
were frequently "frozen" the moment even tentative agreement emerged,
on the oft-repeated assurance that drafting problems would be handled later.
These problems will be resolved as the conference faces its last and per-
haps most severe test: to convert the final informal text to a draft conven-
tion and move it through formal debate and formal procedures to final
adoption.
To be sure, the eighth session had its diversions. They might usefully
be described before the detailed discussion of its substantive work.
Deep Seabed Mining Legislation
On the first day in Geneva and the last day in New York, the chairman
of the Group of 77 made a statement that challenged the legality of national
legislation authorizing deep seabed mining and argued that its enactment
would violate the rule of good faith in negotiations and have an impact
beyond the sphere of the conference on economic cooperation between de-
veloping and developed countries. The U.S. and other delegations re-
iterated that the contemplated legislation is consistent with existing interna-
tional law and compatible with their commitment to the conclusion at ie
earliest possible time of a generally acceptable law of the sea convention.
The arguments were substantially the same as those made during -the seventh
session.29
29 See Letter of April 25, 1979 prepared by Group of 77's Group of Legal Experts on
Legislation, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/77; letter of Aug. 23, 1979 from Chairman of Group
of 77, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/89; statement by the Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation
in response, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/93 (Oct. 1, 1979); Oxman, The Seventh Session,
note 1 supra, at 30-38.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the states members of the Group of 77, meeting in
New York a month after the end of the 8th session, adopted on September 29 a resolu-
tion in which they:
1. Declare that:
(a) Any unilateral measures, legislation or agreement restricted to a limited num-
ber of States on sea-bed mining are unlawful and violate well-established and
imperative rules of international law;
(b) Such unilateral acts will not be recognized by the international community,
and that, these acts, being unlawful, will entail international responsibility on the
part of States who commit them, and an investor will not have legal security for
his investments in activities in pursuance of such acts;
2. Urge all States to refrain from taking any unilateral action on set-bed mining
and appeals to them to bring the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea to a successful and early conclusion.
UN Does. A/34/611 (Oct. 23, 1979), A/CONF.62/94 (Oct. 19, 1979).
On December 14, 1979, the U.S. Senate passed, and sent to the Hou:e of Repre-
sentatives, a bill regarding deep seabed mining that would not, however, allow com-
mercial recovery to commence before 1982. S. 493 (amendment No. 540), 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), 125 CONG. REc. S18554 (1979). In the 95th Congress, deep seabed
[Vol. 74
CONFERENCE ON TE LAW OF THE SEA
A new element was the all but explicit attitude of some developing country
leaders working the hardest to promote an accommodation on deep seabed
mining issues that enactment of legislation at this time would be insensitive
and could compromise their efforts. On the other hand, withdrawal of
support for legislation could be misinterpreted as a lack of determination
and could lead to serious miscalculations by others. Failure to deal prop-
erly with these competing considerations could cause disruption and delay.
Exercise of Rights
During the meeting in New York, there were news reports that the United
States had instructed its forces to exercise the freedoms of the high seas
beyond the 3-mile limit of the territorial sea currently recognized by the
United States. Various foreign ministries requested immediate clarifica-
tion, some issuing statements that such a policy was illegal and would violate
their sovereignty in broader territorial seas.' 1 The Group of Coastal States
at the conference-largely dormant since the completion of negotiations on
access to fisheries of the economic zone-met on several occasions to con-
sider its response.3 2
mining legislation was passed by the House of Representatives but was not voted upon
by the Senate before adjournment. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124
CoNG. REc. H7341, H7382 (1978).
.:" See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1979, §A, at 1. Responses of the U.S. Government to
inquiries, based on guidance made available to the author, were generally as follows:
Early last year, the Administration undertook a review of international maritime
claims and their possible effects on U.S. interests, particularly our interest in main-
taining freedom of navigation and overflight. As you know, the United States
recognizes only a three-mile territorial sea established from the coast within which
any nation may exercise the right of innocent passage. Beyond three miles, we be-
lieve that all nations have the right to freely navigate or overfly these high seas.
Our review concluded that U.S. interests, and the interests of the international
community, are best served by maintaining our long-standing position. It was also
recognized that a proliferation of maritime claims which purported to control naviga-
tion and overflight beyond three miles might endanger U.S. interests.
The study was concluded in March of this year. Acting on the conclusions of
the study, the Departments of State and Defense were directed to insure that U.S.
activities on the high seas were fully consistent with our long-standing policy. The
Department of Defense was directed to insure that in normal operations they did
not operate in a manner which might be construed as an acquiescence in a claim
which we do not recognize. They were not, however, ordered to challenge, in an
aggressive way, such claims.
The United States has indicated that it could accept a twelve-mile territorial sea,
as part of a comprehensive agreement in the Law of the Sea Conference. Our
recognition of such a limit is, however, contingent upon acceptance by other nations
of the other provisions of the current LOS text relating to the freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight, particularly transit through straits.
1 See Declarations of Aug. 18, 1979 by the Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Ecuador,
Chile and Peru, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/85 (Aug. 22, 1979).
.-! Chaired by Mexico, the Group of Coastal States includes most of the delegations of
major coastal states except, in general, those that are major maritime powers or members
of the Group of Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States. As with similar
groups, the criteria for membership are flexible, participation in meetings varies, and no
attempt is made to discipline members.
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During the last week of the session, the Group of Coastal States declared,
in part:
The Group of Coastal States noted with surprise and concern recent
media reports that the Government of the United States of America had
"ordered its Navy and Air Force to undertake a policy of deliberately
sending ships and planes into or over the disputed waters of nations
that claim a territorial limit of more than three miles."
In the view of the Group of Coastal States such a policy, which in its
essentials has been confirmed by officials of the United States Govern-
ment, is highly regrettable and unacceptable being contrary to cus-
tomary international law, whereby a great majority of States exercise
full sovereignty in their territorial seas up to a limit of 12 nautical miles,
subject to the right of innocent passage. That policy is also inconsistent
with the prevailing understanding at the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea which has recognized the validity of such a practice.
The Group has taken note of the clarification which was later made
by officials of the United States Government to the effect that there
has been no order to challenge in an aggressive way the claims of other
nations. However, the Group of Coastal States considers the state-
ment that the regime of high seas commences beyond thr'ee miles is
clearly an anachronism.
The Group reaffirms its determination to continue working towards
the early adoption of a generally acceptable comprehensive Convention
on the Law of the Sea and, in the meantime, expresses its hope that
every State will refrain from undertaking any actions that may ad-
versely affect its relations with other States or the success of the con-
ference.33
The United States made the following response:
It is both surprising and distressing that distorted press reports should
have caused such a stir at the Law of the Sea Conference, where the
views of the United States with respect to navigation and overflight
have long been well known to all participants. Press reports notwith-
standing, those views have not changed. Activities in the oceans by
the United States are fully in keeping with its long-standing policy and
with international law, which recognizes that rights which ,re not con-
sistently maintained will ultimately be lost.
At the same time, it remains the firm position of the United States
that a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty offers by far the best, and
perhaps the last, opportunity to establish a universally agreed and
conflict-free regime governing all uses of the world's oceans and their
resources. We have indicated that, as part of such an agreement, we
could accept a 12-mile territorial sea coupled with transit passage of
straits used for international navigation, all within the context of the
overall package deal. In this regard, we note that the Group of Coastal
States reaffirms its determination to continue working towards the early
adoption of a generally accepted comprehensive Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
33UN Docs. A/CONF.62/90, A/CONF.62/SR.118 (provisional) (Aug. 30, 1979),
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Let us not be diverted from our shared goal by debate over the very
differences in national regimes that compelled our governments to enter
into negotiations in the first place.34
Statements criticizing the U.S. position were made by Angola, Argentina,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, the Philip-
pines, Romania, and Vietnam23 The USSR said the Group of Coastal
States was "justified in its anxiety, to which the Soviet delegation was
sympathetic," but distinguished between 12-mile and 200-mile claims26
The Soviet expression of regret that the United States had not refuted or
denied the press reports:,7 illustrates the extent to which political tempta-
tions may compromise substantive positions. Along with the other state-
ments, it should be a warning to those who, in preference to a treaty, would
rely on the major powers to make and enforce the law.
II. DEEP SEABED MINING
One of the procedural innovations at the eighth session was the attempt
to torn a small working group to negotiate on various outstanding deep sea-
bed mining matters. As has so often happened, what was supposed to be a
"small" group of 21, composed of ten developing countries, ten indus-
trialized states, and China, was soon expanded to include alternates and
attracted large numbers of observers. Accordingly, by the time of the
New York meeting, the Working Group of 21 (WG21) had evolved into a
general coordinating mechanism in which the chairman of the First Com-
iittee was associated with the chairmen of Negotiating Groups 1 and 2, and
which also included the Group of Legal Experts on Settlement of (seabed)
Disputes. In addition, having successfully completed his work as chairman
of Negotiating Group 4, Ambassador Nandan of Fiji was requested to chair
a group of consumers and land-based producers working on the question
of production limitations.
It may be helpful to view many of the new texts on deep seabed mining
as dealing with three types of problems:
(1) the need for considerable specificity in order to allay fears that
the Seabed Authority, intentionally or otherwise, may use its discretion
in ways that are discriminatory, that discourage mining by states or
their nationals (or for that matter by the Enterprise), or that other-
wise prejudice consumer interests (or land-based producer interests);
(2) the need to ensure that specific treaty provisions establish re-
quirements that do not discourage seabed mining (or mining on land)
and are accordingly based on reasonable projections of alternative eco-
nomic possibilities; and
(3) the need to ensure that the powers of the Seabed Authority are
exercised in a manner that reflects the desires not only of the majority
but of the major economic interests at stake, particularly those of con-
sumers, seabed producers, and land-based producers.
UN Docs. A/CONF.62/92 (Oct. 1, 1979), A/CONF.62/SR.118 (provisional) (Aug.
30, 1979), at 4.
UN Doe. A/CONF.62/SR.118 (provisional) (Aug. 30, 1979), at 5-8.
*" Id. at 6-7. 3. Ibid.
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Mining Conditions
To deal with the first problem, both the procedural and substantive re-
quirements for obtaining a mining contract and operating under it must be
specified precisely or within precise limits, or in some cases on the basis of
reasonably precise criteria. One aspect of the need for precision is perhaps
best understood by noting that if the relevant requirement is a prerequisite
to mining, voting power alone cannot solve the problem. Major consumers
and seabed producers can hope to have no greater assured voting power in
the Authority than the reasonable prospect of preventing adver:;e decisions.
They will be unable to impose positive decisions. The solution to the risk
of inaction or deadlock is to establish the precise conditions for mining in
advance: in the treaty and in the initial rules and regulations to be drafted
by the preparatory commission.
The very nature of the problem of specificity made necessary a painstaking
review of every provision of part XI and Annexes II and III. It accounts
for most of the changes made in the ICNT/Rev. I and proposed in the re-
port of the Working Group of 21.38
Those changes would be capped by the text suggested for Article 6, para-
graph 3 of Annex II in the WG21 report. Under this provision, proposed
plans of work of prospective miners are dealt with in the order in which they
are received, and are subject to inquiry as to their compliance with terms of
the convention and the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority.
As soon as the inquiry is completed, "the Authority shall approve such
plans of work, provided that they conform to the uniform and nondis-
criminatory requirements established by the rules, regulations and pro-
cedures of the Authority," subject only to itemized exceptions. This pro-
vision applies to all organs of the Authority, including the Council. The
itemized exceptions relate to specific limitations in the convention: namely,
when the proposed area is included in a previously submitted plan of work,
when the proposed area has been disapproved for exploitation on the
grounds of serious harm to a unique environment, when selection among
different applicants will be necessary because approval of all plans of work
submitted during the particular period would exceed the production limita-
tion, or when the proposed plan of work has been submitted or sponsored
by a state that would thereby exceed the specified antimonopoly limits.
While factual evaluation may be necessary to ascertain compliance with the
specified requirements, the act of approving a plan of work is not dis-
cretionary.
The need for specificity also accounts in part for the second problem
enumerated above. To the extent that quantitative standards and limi-
tations are made specific, there must be reasonable assurance that they
are consistent with alternative economic projections of reasonable prob-
ability. These requirements explain the prodigious detail of the texts on
financial obligations of miners and the complexity of the interim production
limitation. Preparation of these provisions poses a substantial, if not unique,
38 Note 3 supra.
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TABLE I
RATES OF PAYMENT FOR DEEP SEABED MINING OPERATIONS
First Second
Period of Period of
Return on Commercial Commercial
Investment Production Production
Rates of Payment
Greater than 0%,
but less than 10% 35 % 40%
Equal to or greater
than 10%, but
less than 20% 42.5% 50%
Equal to or greater
than 20% 50 % 70%
challenge to unite the disciplines of diplomacy, law, and economics in a
group expert enough, small enough, but representative enough to negotiate
results that can survive scrutiny by the conference.
Financial Arrangements
The texts contained in the WG21 report 39 would permit a contractor to
choose a mixed system under which he would make both payments propor-
tional to production 4 and payments proportional to profits, at rates ad-
justed to reflect alternative hypotheses of low, average, and high profitability.
Relying generally on the ratio of the miner's development costs in the min-
ing sector to his total development costs, the texts attribute to deep seabed
operations a minimum of 25 percent of the net proceeds of a fully integrated
three-metal project (nickel, copper, and cobalt). They establish two rates
of payment for each incremental part of the attributable net proceeds, as
shown in table I.
The second period begins when the contractor recovers his total develop-
ment costs as "cash surplus," including interest at 10 percent per annum on
that portion of his development costs not recovered by his cash surplus.
Thus, the Authority would share very handsomely in the proceeds of a
highly efficient and profitable operation-a factor that should help alleviate
concerns of both developing and industrialized countries. Estimated pay-
ments from a mine site over 20 years range from $258 million to $1,964 mil-
lion."1 While many variables are involved, the differences in practice may
still be substantial enough to persuade developing countries in the Authority
3" WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, text of Ann. II, Art. 12.
4- The production charge would be 2% per annum, but would rise to 4% in any year
in the second period of commercial production in which the return on investment is at
least 15%. The contractor would pay either the production charge or an annual fixed
tee of $1 million, whichever is greater.
41 WG21 report, note 3 supra, at 22 (added by UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.26/Corr.1
(Aug. 22, 1979) ).
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of the desirability of promoting the efficiency of seabed miners and avoid-
ing regulations that discourage or restrain efficiency. Even if they are
only partly persuaded, this could be the incentive for a more general in-
terest in promoting economic efficiency by representatives of developing
countries whose interests as consumers alone have proved to be insufficient
incentive. The economic importance of such an evolution, of course,
transcends deep seabed mining alone. Other things being equal, an ex-
periment on a relatively modest scale that gives developing countries a
direct financial stake in the profits derived from efficiency may have much
to commend it at this time.
These are, however, considerations for the future. The reluctance of
developing countries to accept lower financial obligations for miners, par-
ticularly in early or less profitable years, was related directly to the de-
veloping countries' desire to ensure that the Enterprise has enough money
to commence mining quickly, either on its own or as a substantial joint
venture partner. The more apparent the desires of industrial states to
avoid a heavy "front-end load" on the financial obligations of miners and
to insulate their right to obtain a contract from vague requirements of sup-
port for the Enterprise, the greater the concerns expressed by developing
countries about the financial capacity of the Enterprise to go ipto business.
Thus, the text proposed in the WG21 report 42 would require that the
Enterprise be assured of the funds necessary to explore and exploit one
mine site and to transport, process, and market the metals recovered from
that site. The amount in question would be determined by the Assembly
on the recommendation of the Council, which, in turn, would be advised
by the Governing Board of the Enterprise. 43 States parties would be re-
quired to make available to the Enterprise one-half of the sum in the form
of long-term, interest-free loans. The other half would be borrowed by
the Enterprise on commercial markets, but the loans would be guaranteed
by the states parties. While repayment of the commercial loans would
take priority over repayment of the government loans, the text does not spell
out details of the latter, merely specifying that a schedule of repayment
shall be adopted by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Govern-
ing Board of the Enterprise.
Current estimates of the cost of developing a mine site vary from $750
million to over $1,100 million. The obligations of states parties would be
apportioned among them in accordance with the normal United Nations
scale of assessments. For example, under the current level of assessments
the United States would be expected to provide 2,5 percent of the govern-
ment loans and to guarantee 25 percent of the commercial loans. Since
the main creditor states will be a small group, it is appropriate that a bal-
anced organ of the Authority responsive to their interests, as well as to the
interests of the debtor, deal with such matters. The Council of the Au-
42 WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, amendments to Ann. III, Art. 10.
43 Under ICNT/Rev.1, Annex III, Article 5, the Governing Board of the Enterprise
would consist of "15 qualified members" elected by the Assembly of the Authority
"based on the principle of equitable geographical representation."
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thority might satisty this need, while the Assembly and the Governing
Board of the Enterprise would not. Accordingly, further work on these
problems can be anticipated.
The Assembly and the Council
The third problem, namely, the need to ensure protection for the major
economic interests at stake, was the subject of particularly intensive con-
sideration in New York after the issuance of the ICNT/Rev.1. The negotia-
tions have generally proceeded on the assumption that such protection would
be afforded in a Council of limited size whose composition and voting pat-
terns were designed to balance and reflect the various interests. This ap-
proach, however, raises questions about the allocation of powers and func-
tions to other organs of the Authority where such protection is not afforded,
in particular the Assembly.
The texts in the WG21 report reflect substantial progress on these ques-
tions. They avoid an), implication of broad implied powers in any organ
by specifying that the powers and functions of the Authority are those
"expressly conferred upon it by" the convention and only include "such in-
cidental powers, consistent with the provisions of this Convention, as are
implicit in and necessary for the performance of these powers and functions
With respect to activities in the Area." 44 In addition, a new provision re-
quires each principal organ of the Authority, in exercising its powers and
functions, to "avoid taking any action which may derogate from or impede
the exercise of specific powers and functions conferred upon another
organ." ' While the developing countries refused to eliminate the term
"supreme organ," it was possible to elaborate on its use by changing the
provision in question to read, the "Assembly, as the sole organ of the
Authority consisting of all the members, shall be considered the supreme
organ of the Authority to which the other principal organs shall be ac-
countable as specifically provided in this Part." 4'
In a similar vein, the text proposed by the chairman of the Group of Legal
Experts on settlement of disputes would provide for selection of the 11 mem-
bers of the Seabed Disputes Chamber by the Law of the Sea Tribunal itself,
rather than by the Assembly of the Seabed Authority. The Assembly could
make recommendations of a general character with regard to criteria for
selection, it being understood that these would be guidelines only and would
not relate to specific membership.47
One problem regarding the relationship between the Council and the
Assembly is that the confusion in the provisions concerning the adoption
of rules, regulations, and procedures has not been eliminated. There are
several different provisions on this matter that could usefully be united.48
14 WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, Art. 157.
4.- Id., Art. 158. 4 Id., Art. 160.
'r Id., amendment to Ann. V, Art. 36.
l"ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 160(2)(f), (j), and (n) and Art. 162(2)(n) and (p).
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The most precise of them (Article 160, paragraph 2(n) and Article 162,
paragraph 2(n), refer to each other and would provide a sound basis for
consolidation.-3
Discussion of the voting question centered on a so-called "two-tier" ap-
proach to substantive issues in the Council. With respect to specified issues
for which the special interests at stake need relatively less protection, a
decision would require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting,
including an absolute majority of the members of the Council. With re-
spect to all other substantive matters, the requisite vote would be a two-
thirds majority of those present and voting, but only if a fixed number of
negative votes were not cast. Although this proposal is contained in the
WG21 report,"0 the United States and other Western delegations had al-
ready indicated that they could not support it in the absence of a satis-
factory blocking number. They could accept the number 5 for -this purpose,
while developing countries' "compromise" suggestions generally ranged
from 7 to 9. Meanwhile, the Soviet delegation continued to support the
voting approach contained in the ICNT, ignoring the fact that it had al-
ready been completely rejected as a basis for agreement. Therefore, as a
practical matter, a basis for consensus on the key problem of voting has thus
far eluded the conference.
In connection with agreement on a satisfactory blocking number, the
voting proposal in WG21 would eliminate the provision in the I[CNT/Rev.1
that a plan of work would be deemed to be approved by the Council unless
disapproved within 60 days of its submission by the Technical Commission.5'
The new text '2 would require the Council to act on a plan of work within
60 days of its submission. The plan would be deemed to be approved
unless a proposal for its approval or disapproval had been voted upon within
that 60-day period. Developing countries, in pressing for this change, ar-
gued that the ICNT rule could result in the approval of a plan of work
even if the commission's recommendation and a majority vote of the Council
were opposed to it. The proposed change in the text, however, goes much
further than is necessary to deal with this point, particularly since the ap-
proval of a plan of work is not a discretionary function.53
40 Given the technical and legally binding character of the rules, regulations, and
procedures, the author would note his long-held preference for their submission by the
Council to governments, coupled with a time limit for disapproval by a specified number
of parties, as.in the ICAO and 1973 IMCO Conventions, rather than (or perhaps after)
submission to the Assembly. An approach such as that taken in the 1973 Marine Pollu-
tion Convention, which provides special protection for interested states in the entry into
force procedure for technical regulatory changes, could be a basis for helpful protec-
tions to supplement those provided by the composition and voting rules of the Council.
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 3
Bevans 944, 15 UNTS 295; International Convention for the Prevention of 'Pollution from
Ships, 1973, IMCO Doc. MP/CONF.WP.35, reprinted in 12 ILM 1319 (191'3).
50 WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, amendments to Art. 161.
51 Art. 162(2) (j).
5-, WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, amendment to Xrt. 162(2)(j).
53 Of course, the substantive provisions regarding approval of contracts that have
already been discussed, including Annex II, Article 6, are also relevant to this problem,
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The question of voting is also related to the question of composition of
the Council. A variety of proposals on the matter will have to be con-
sidered at the next session, including one by the United States that the
overall membership of the Council represent at least 50 percent of world
production and 50 percent of world consumption of the categories of min-
erals that are produced from the deep seabeds."-
Settlement of Disputes
The work done by the Group of Legal Experts on Settlement of Disputes
regarding the deep seabeds is reflected both in the ICNT/Rev.1 and in the
WG21 report. Among the interesting new provisions are amendments to
Article 168 that provide for redress, including the possibility of dismissal,
against staff members of the Authority who disclose any proprietary data
or confidential information of commercial value. The Authority is re-
quired, at the request of an affected party, to submit the complaint against
the staff member concerned "to an appropriate tribunal," which presumably
could include a special administrative tribunal established by the Authority.
The Secretary-General of the Authority is required to dismiss the staff mem-
ber concerned if the tribunal so recommends. 55
The Group of Legal Experts devoted a great deal of time to the question
of jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The ICNT/Rev.1 reflects
the view that a contractor may elect commercial arbitration rather than
the Seabed Disputes Chamber for disputes arising under a contract, but
the provision requires clarification."3
as are important dispute settlement questions such as the nature of the tribunal and the
scope of review.
;'While the effect of an existing proposal in Articles 161(1)(a) and (b) of the
ICNT/Rev.I that amounts to a guaranteed seat for the Soviet Union and a Soviet ally
among the largest seabed mining countries and consumers is mainly psychological, and
by no means unflattering to Western technology, the provision is politically unpopular
and might become an issue.
---, While the problem of protecting the confidentiality of commercial information is
dealt with in the same provision as problems of misconduct generally, its purpose is at
least as much the direct protection of state and private property as protection of the
Authority or its internal administration. Dismissal may be an inadequate deterrent,
for example, when the employee is planning to leave or has left. The provision does
not deal with the allocation of criminal or civil jurisdiction among the states concerned.
Short of universal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to try or hear a case against the staff member
for unlawful disclosure might exist in the state of his nationality, in the state affected by
the violation, or in the state in which the violation occurred. This jurisdictional ap-
proach is consistent with that of the ICNT/Rev.1 to questions such as pirate broadcasting
and pollution. See Arts. 109, 142, 216, 217, 218, 220, and 221. A violation of the
confidentiality requirements of the convention by a staff member might not be an act
performed in the exercise of his functions for the purpose of immunity from legal process
under Article 181. Even if it were such an act, the substance of the new provision in
the WG21 report would seem to preclude a claim of immunity or require its waiver in
appropriate cases. Moreover, the WG21 report's amendment to Annex II, Article 21
makes clear that the Authority would be liable for violation of the confidentiality re-
quirement by the Secretary-General and the staff.
", ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 188. This clarification might perhaps include harmonization
with the special provision on arbitration regarding financial terms of a contract found
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The question whether disputes over deep seabed mining involving, or at
least between, states parties should be subject to the mandatory jurisdiction
of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, or to the same choice of procedures (in-
cluding arbitration) enjoyed with respect to other disputes under the con-
vention, 57 is approaching resolution on the basis of permitting the formation
of a special chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal or an ad hc chamber of
the Seabed Disputes Chamber.-s
One of the most important issues relating to the proposed Seabed Au-
thority concerns fears that its organs may exceed or misuse their powers in
violation of the convention. This issue poses classic questions of judicial
review dealt with in the constitutional and administrative law of many
countries. There were few problems with the principle of judicial review of
administrative acts, as such review is common in municipal law. The dif-
ficulty arose over the exercise of discretionary powers to adopt rules, regula-
tions, and procedures regarding activities in the Area, the essence of the
regulatory or quasi-legislative functions of the Authority. These decisions
require the concurrence of both the Council and the Assembly.
The solution proposed is to prohibit the tribunal from substituting its own
discretion for that of the Authority, and from making any general pro-
nouncement on the validity of a rule, regulation, or procedure or on its
conformity with the convention. On the other hand, it can determine that
the application of a rule, regulation, or procedure in a particular case would
conflict with the obligations of one of the parties (e.g., the Authority) under
the convention or a contract, and it can consider claims concerning lack of
competence or misuse of power, as well as claims for damages or other
remedies for failure to comply with the convention or a contractual obliga-
tion. 59
Article 295 repeats the traditional rule in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice that a decision has no binding force except between the
in Annex II, Article 12, paragraph 15. It should also be noted that Annex I1, Article
5, paragraph 2 contains elaborate conciliation and arbitration provision., regarding the
miner's contractual undertaking to make technology available to the Enterprise "on fair
and reasonable commercial terms and conditions." The specificity of the contract,
coupled with its required guarantee of "security of tenure" (Art. 1513, para. 6 and
Ann. II, Art. 15), supply the legal foundation for arbitral protection of contractual ex-
pectations against "public law" intrusions. See arbitral award between Texaco Over-
seas Petroleum Co./Califomia Asiatic Oil Co. and Libya, reprinted in 17 ILM 3 (1978)
and discussed generally infra at p. 134.
37 See ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 287.
58 WG21 report, note 3 supra, App. A, Art. 188. The underlying concept is that the
selection by the parties of 3 judges from a larger number approximates, or at least ac-
commodates, the views of those favoring arbitration. Submission of the dispute to the
special chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal would require the assent of both
parties, while submission to the ad hoc chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber would
be mandatory if any party requests it. Only the former could include nationals of the
parties. Compare ICNT/Rev.1, Ann. V, Arts. 15 and 17 with the proposed Ann. V,
Art. 36 bis in the WG21 report, App. A.
59 ICNT/Rev.1, Art..190.
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parties and in respect to that particular dispute."0 In this light, the dis-
tinction between jurisdiction to declare a regulation invalid and jurisdiction
to declare its application in that case unlawful might withstand scrutiny,
it Article 295 applies to decisions against the Authority at all. What must
be noted is that under Article 152, the Authority is required to avoid dis-
crimination in the exercise of its powers and functions.
A general substantive prohibition on discrimination among members
would seem to be implicit in the law governing regulatory actions of in-
ternational organizations and is explicit in the proposed law of the sea con-
vention. When the Authority loses a case, it must adjust its subsequent
treatment of similarly situated entities in order to avoid discrimination.
Moreover, a court will not wish to render inconsistent decisions if it thereby
puts itself in the position of requiring the Authority either to violate its
nondiscrimination obligation or to readjust its regulations frequently.61
III. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
At the end of the seventh session, two competing formulas for defining the
outer limit of the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles from
the coast were under consideration.6 2 The so-called Irish formula provided
for alternative criteria of distance from the foot of the continental slope or
thickness of sediment in relation to the distance from the foot of the con-
tinental slope." The Soviet formula provided for a fixed distance from
shore of 300 miles from the coast (baseline) as the maximum permissible
limit for the continental margin where it extends beyond 200 miles.64 In
addition, at least some Arab countries maintained a formal reservation
regarding any coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond
200 miles.'5
The Outer Limit
The idea of combining the Irish and Soviet formulas occurred naturally
enough. The basis for any such combination would be the following points:
Art. 59, Statute of the ICJ.
*' This would be true whether or not req judicata and collateral estoppel are technically
available. The technical point would be one of offensive use of collateral estoppel by a
stranger to the earlier case against the party defeated in the earlier case. This practice
recently received the qualified approval of the Supreme Court of the United States,
despite the absence of "mutuality" (i.e., the party asserting collateral estoppel would
not have been bound or estopped by the earlier judgment). Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979). As to the offensive use of collateral estoppel on a question
ot law, it might be observed that the jurisprudence of common law jurisdictions would
tend to be colored by the doctrine of stare decisis, while the jurisprudence of many ad-
ministrative courts in civil law jurisdictions (among others) in analogous situations
would tend to be colored by their power to address questions of validity of regulations
directly.
- These are discussed by the author in 73 AJIL (1979) at pp. 19-22.
-' Conf. Doe. NG6/1 (1978), reproduced in part in 73 AJIL 19 n.59.
64 C.2/Informal Meeting/14 (1978), reproduced in part in 73 AJIL 20 n.61.
6 Conf. Doe. NG6/2 (1978).
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(1) The continental shelf extends to a defined outer edge of the con-
tinental margin or, irrespective of the geological nature of the seabed,
to 200 miles from the coast (baseline).
(2) The continental margin is the natural prolongation of the land
territory of the coastal state; it consists of the seabed and subsoil of the
shelf, the slope, and the rise, and does not include the deep ocean floor
or its subsoil.
(3) The Irish formula is a reasonable means for avoiding a "last grain
of sand" misinterpretation of what is meant by the continental rise.
It defines the outer edge of the continental margin by joining fixed
points where the thickness of sedimentary rock is at least 1 percent
of the shortest distance from such points to the foot of the continental
slope or, alternatively, by joining fixed points that are not more than
60 miles from the foot of the continental slope.
(4) Notwithstanding the criteria of the Irish formula, there would
be a maximum limit for the continental shelf applicable only where
the outer edge of the continental margin, as determined under the
Irish formula, would otherwise extend beyond that limit.
The problem in dealing with the last point is that any cut-off expressed
solely in terms of distance from the shore would have to be considerably
greater than the 300 miles originally proposed by the Soviet Union in order
to include certain areas important to some broad-margin states. Accord-
ingly, the idea emerged of alternative criteria for the cut-off, one expressed
in terms of distance from the coast, and the other expressed in terms of
distance from a readily identifiable seabed feature, in this case a specified
isobath (depth contour)."6
On the basis of broad negotiations along these lines, the chairman of the
Second Committee and Negotiating Group 6 proposed a text that became
Article 76 of the ICNT/Rev.1. For determining the cut-off, the chairman
selected alternative criteria of 350 nautical miles from the coast (baseline) or
100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath, whichever is further sea-
ward. Thus, the outer limit of the continental shelf (the area of the seabed
and subsoil over which the coastal state exercises sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources) is the outer
edge of the continental margin as defined under the Irish formula, except
that:
(1) the continental shelf extends up to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the coast (baseline), even if the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin is at a lesser distance from the coast; and
(2) the fixed points defining the outer limit of the coninental shelf
may not exceed 350 nautical miles from the coast (baseline) or 100
nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath, whichever is further
seaward.
66 So stylized was the relationship between the opposing sides that for a considerable
period, to symbolize its emergence from the center of the table rather than from any
delegation, and perhaps to suggest a customary affection for tea among the original chefs,
the proposal was called the "biscuit."
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Ridges
The provision that the continental margin "does not include the deep
ocean floor or the subsoil thereof' contains a footnote recording a general
understanding that a mutually acceptable formulation will be drawn up
"on the question of underwater oceanic ridges." 67  This wording correctly
suggests that ridges that partake of the same qualities as the deep ocean
floor or the subsoil thereof are not part of the continental margin, a con-
clusion that would seem apparent from the chairman's use of "underwater
oceanic ridges""' since the word "oceanic" in the context of this phrase
cannot be construed simply to mean "underwater."
The Irish formula is a means for establishing the "outer edge" of the con-
tinental margin. The continental margin remains the seabed and subsoil
of the shelf, the slope, and the rise. By no stretch of the imagination can
oceanic ridges such as the Mid-Atlantic Ridge properly be regarded as fall-
ing within this definition of the continental margin, nor can the sides of
these great mountain chains be regarded as the foot of the continental slope
for purposes of applying the Irish formula. The fact that a 2,500-meter
isobath may surround a ridge is irrelevant. There is no basis for any other
conclusion in the conference records, the informal debates, the intent of
the lawyers and geologists working on the problem in the so-called Mar-
gineers Group, or the Secretariat study and maps illustrating various for-
mulas for the definition of the continental shelf.69
The complication that arises because portions of the continental rise over-
lie the deep ocean floor should be resolved in the same way, whether the
ocean floor is regular or irregular at that point. The statement, already
contained in the text, that the continental margin "does not include the deep
ocean floor" is properly construed to be consistent with the inclusion within
the continental margin of those portions of the continental rise that overlie
oceanic crust (and satisfy the criteria of the Irish formula); it would not
seem logically necessary to do more in the text than clarify that this ex-
clusion of the deep ocean floor from the definition of the continental margin
applies, with the same effect, to the ridges of the deep ocean floor. 0
67 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 76, para. 3 and note 1.
rs Emphasis added.
69 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.98 and Adds. 1 & 2; R. Platz~der, note 3 supra, 3
GENFER SESSION 1978, at 871 (Add. 1 maps not reproduced).
7o Objections to this approach by some broad-margin states' seem to contradict the
underlying interpretation of the article as a whole. It may be desirable, but it should
be unnecessary to insist on, the introduction of a term such as "oceanic crust" for the
first time and solely in connection with ridges. Conversely, insistence on exclusion of
such a term is difficult to understand. Language similar to that used by the chairman
of the committee in his footnote might be suitable. Nevertheless, legal and geological
experts were drawn into complex discussions and drafting exercises about ridges of con-
tinental formation, plateaux, oceanic crust, and so on. See Report of Negotiating Group
6, note 3 supra. To this observer, at times it seemed a final, sentimental replay of dis-
cussions regarding the nature of the continental margin that dominated earlier stages
of the conference.
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The 2500-meter isobath may not be a particularly stringent limitation
in areas where the seabed is highly irregular. To avoid unreasonable
claims, the proposed Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf "
should give careful scrutiny to the delimitation charts submitted by the
coastal state for such areas.72
In this connection, it could be important to correct paragraph 7 of Arti-
cle 76 along the lines suggested by Singapore and other delegations.73 The
current text reads, "The limits of the [continental] shelf established by
a coastal State taking into account these recommendations [of the Com-
mission] shall be final and binding." 74 That sentence cannot conceivably
mean what it seems to say, namely, that the coastal state can establish
final limits binding on the rest of the world simply by "taking into ac-
count," but possibly in significant respects rejecting, the Commission's
recommendations. It is reasonable to suggest that if the coastal state
chooses to implement the Commission's recommendations, the limit should
be final and binding. In other cases, there should be a procedure for
dealing with the matter.
Sri Lanka Proposal
The chairman of the Second Committee and Negotiating Group 6 stated
in another footnote that there was widespread sympathy for Sri Lanka
because of the difficulty of applying the Irish formula to the geological
and geomorphological conditions off its coast. Sri Lanka points out that
the foot of the continental slope and the 2,500-meter isobath are very
close to its coast, while there is an exceedingly broad continental rise that
extends many hundreds of miles from the coast. Sri Lanka argues that
this rise qualifies under the general principle that the continental margin
consists of the shelf, the slope, and the rise but is excluded by the more
detailed rules for defining the outer limit of the continental shelf and
continental margin. Notwithstanding the genuine sympathy for Sri Lanka,
there is opposition to relaxing the requirements of Article 76, particularly
if relaxation would have the effect of broadening the limits of the continen-
tal shelf off other states as well.75
71 The text of the informal Canadian paper on the organization and functions of the
commission appears in 73 AJIL 20 n.62. Informal consultations were held on the basis
of this paper; agreement seems imminent.
72 It might be noted that the "rule of thumb" regarding the location of the foot of the
continental slope (the point of maximum change in gradient at its base) applies only
"in the absence of evidence to the contrary." More important, as noted before, the Irish
formula deals with the location of the outer edge of the continental margin. It provides
no justification for placing that outer edge in an area that is beyond the continental
margin itself, that is, beyond the shelf, slope, and rise. These and other factors would
presumably be considered by the commission in reviewing the submissions of the
coastal state.
73 See Report of Negotiating Group 6, note 3 supra, item (d).
74Bracketed words added.
75 The conference has become increasingly sensitive to permitting generalized ex-
tensions of the continental shelf to vast distances from the coast. It seems (with
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Revenue Sharing
The general approach of the ICNT to the sharing by the coastal state
of revenues from mineral exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200
miles was retained."M While the revision of the ICNT maintains the
1 percent annual increments in payment to commence after 5 years, it in-
creases the maximum rate of payment by the coastal state to 7 percent of the
value of production reached in the 12th year of commercial production
at the site, rather than the previous 5 percent reached in the 10th year.77
Proposals were made to shift this formula to a more complex one based on
net profits, but they had little support.
A related question was raised about the exclusion of any developing
country from the revenue-sharing obligation for a mineral resource pro-
duced from its continental shelf when the country is a net importer of that
resource.- Since it is likely, particularly in the early years, that only very
large potential oil and gas fields will be developed in most areas where
the continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles from the coast, a coastal
state capable of consuming all that oil and gas and still needing to import
more may well be considerably more advanced than many other devel-
oping countries.
The U.S. delegation proposed alternative means of dealing with this
question that would apply to all developing coastal states, not merely net
importers. A developing coastal state would have two options. It could
choose to remain in the system, making the payments required of it. In
that case, in calculating its benefits, an adjustment would be made in order
to produce an equitable result. Alternatively, the developing coastal state
could opt out altogether for a fixed period of years. In that case, it would
neither make payments nor receive benefits under the systemy 9
exceptions, of course) to feel occasional remorse about the extent of the limits already
reached. In particular, proposals that would breach both cut-offs (350 nautical miles
from the coast or 100 nautical miles seaward of the 2500-meter isobath) seem to
arouse concern.
71 See Stevenson & Oxman, The 1975 Geneva Session, note 1 supra, at p. 782 &
n.43; Oxman, The 1977 New York Session, note 1 supra, at pp. 80-81.
77 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 82, para. 2.
, ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 82, para. 3.
7 Before leaving the seabeds, it might be noted that in case the conference is in
need of additional complexit3 and controversy, it can find it in new excursions into the
arcane interstices of the law of salvage. Two proposals have been made that seem
reasonably likely, once their texts are carefully scrutinized, to drive museum directors,
anthropologists, archeologists, collectors, shipowners, ship charterers, cargo owners,
artists, and adventurers to distraction. Their description in the Report of the Second
Committee, note 3 supra, at 73, is repeated here without further comment:
Article 77
Infonnal suggestion by Cape Verde, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Tunisia
and Yugoslavia (Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/43/Rev.1) to add a new paragraph 5
giving the coastal State sovereign rights over any object of an archaeological and
historical nature on or under its continental shelf for the purpose of research,
salvaging, protection and proper presentation. The State or country of origin,
or the State of historical and archaeological origin, would have preferential rights
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IV. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
From a procedural standpoint, difficulties over the ICNT provisions on
marine scientific research had their roots in the failure of the ICNT text
to adhere to the provisions worked out earlier in the context of negotiations
on the status of the economic zone. 0 Alihough largely tactical, the hesi-
tation of coastal states to agree to alter the ICNT provisions to conform to
those previously negotiated aggravated the negative reaction of the scien-
tific community to the text. As a result, after carefully e.nalyzing the
various problems posed and reluctantly proceeding on the assumption
that the overall structure agreed to in the context of the economic zone
negotiations and largely reflected in the ICNT would have to be preserved
in any agreement, the United States presented a series of technical amend-
ments and adjustments."'
Constructive discussions were held by heads of delegation in Geneva
on this matter. While these discussions led to a revision of the U.S. pro-
posals, there was insufficient opportunity to ready them for incorporation
into the revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text, in part because
some of the same heads of delegation were preoccupied with the intense
negotiations on the outer limit of the continental shelf.
The two issues were linked substantively. One of the proposed amend-
ments eliminated the requirement that the coastal state consent to scien-
tific research on the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles
from the coast. The relationship between these issues was expressly
noted by the chairman of the Second Committee and Negotiating Group 6
in presenting the articles on the definition of the continental shelf, and it
was stressed by the United States in its comments on those articles. The
chairman of the Third Committee, with the support of numerous delega-
tions, announced his intention to hold intensive negotiations on marine
scientific research in New York.
The texts resulting from those negotiations are contained in the report of
the chairman of the Third Committee submitted at the end of the New
York meeting.8 2 While noting the need for additional work, the chairman
stated his assessment that the texts "have a considerable degree of support
as to provide a reasonable prospect for consensus." They "could serve as
a basis for subsequent agreement leading to the revision of the ICNT."
over such objects in the case of sale or any other disposal, resulting in the removal
of such objects out of the coastal State.
Article 98
Informal suggestion by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Doe. C.2/
Informal Meeting/44) to add a paragraph 3 providing that, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Convention and other universally recognized rules of interna-
tional law, sunken ships and aircraft, as well as equipment and cargoes located on
board them, may be salvaged only by the flag State or with its consent.
8oThese negotiations were discussed by the author in 72 AJIL (1978), at pp. 75-78.81 See 73 AJIL at pp. 27-30. 82Note 3 supra.
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The basic structure of the marine scientific research regime for the eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf set forth in the ICNT/Rev.1 is as
follows:
(1) such research "shall be conducted with the consent of the
coastal state";
(2) coastal states "shall, in normal circumstances, grant their con-
sent" for such research; and
(3) coastal states "may however in their discretion withhold their
consent" if a project falls within one of several categories, the most
important being if a project "is of direct significance for the explora-
tion and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-
living." 11
Six months' advance submission to the coastal state of a "full descrip-
tion" of the project is required.4 The ICNT/Rev.1 also requires the
researching state to comply with a number of obligations, such as ensuring
the right of the coastal state to participate or be represented in the project,
submitting final results and an assessment of those results to the coastal
state, and providing access for the coastal state to all data and samples.8'
Normal Circumstances
The elaborate specification of circumstances in which the coastal state
may in its discretion deny consent logically proceeds on the expectation
that in other cases the coastal state will grant consent. Thus, the approach
of the ICNT is different from the approach of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, which merely requires that the coastal state shall not
"normally" withhold its consent.8 3  The use of the word "normally" was
suggested at one point by the chairman of the Third Committee as pos-
83 Art. 246. The other grounds for discretionary refusal of consent under para-
graph 4 are:
(1) The project involves the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful
substances into the marine environment.
(2) Information submitted to the coastal state regarding the nature and objec-
tives of the project is "inaccurate." (This is the basic control over the bona fides
of the project description.)
(3) The researching state has outstanding obligations to the coastal state from
a prior research project. (The obligation is, of course, not "outstanding" for these
purposes if by its nature it cannot be fulfilled until after completion of the research
cruise [e.g., preparation of reports] and good faith efforts are being made for its
timely fulfillment.)
(4) The project involves drilling into the continental shelf. (This simply
repeats the requirement of consent for drilling in Article 81.)
(5) The project involves the construction, operation, or use of artificial islands,
installations, and structures as referred to in Articles 60 and 80. (This cross-
references the requirements for consent under those articles.)
84 ICNT/Rev. 1, Article 248 describes in detail the information to be included.
85 Id., Art. 249.
"6 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, Art. 5, para. 8, 15 UST 471, TIAS
No. 5578, 499 UNTS 311, reprinted in 52 AJIL 858 (1958).
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sibly facilitating compromise, but was rejected in the course of the nego-
tiations.8 7
The United States and others argued that given the careful elaboration
of the discretionary exceptions, the coastal state should be oblged to grant
its consent in all other cases. But this conclusion was found inappropriate
for situations in which substantial hostility or tension between them made
it "impossible" and "unrealistic" to expect the coastal state to consent to
the presence of a scientific research vessel of the researching state off its
coast. Some alluded to situations in which the two governments not only
do not maintain diplomatic relations but do not even accord each other
recognition. Others alluded to situations of intermittent armed conflict
between the two states. The key point is that the abnormal circumstances
that would justify a denial of consent were intended to refer to circum-
stances between the coastal state and the researching state aharacterized
by hostility or tension of such a serious nature as rationally to preclude
the granting of consent."
Essentially, the problem was not so much to define "normal circum-
stances" as to elaborate on its meaning. Thus, the chairman's text pro-
vides that "the absence of diplomatic relations between the coastal state
and the researching state does not necessarily mean that normal circum-
stances do not exist between them for purposes of applying" the require-
ment that consent be granted in normal circumstances.""
The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Miles
Application of the standard of "direct significance for the exploration
and exploitation of natural resources" was the heart of the problem re-
garding marine scientific research on the continental shelf where it extends
beyond 200 miles from the coast.
First, the language could be interpreted as affecting scientific research
in the water column beyond the economic zone. The states with broad
continental margins pointed out that this difficulty was merely one aspect
of the general problem of the relationship between the rights of the
coastal state over the continental shelf and high seas freedoms, which was
being dealt with ir' the negotiations on the continental shelf in Negotiating
Group 6.90 As a result, language was added by the chairman of the Second
Committee in the revision of the ICNT continental shelf articles that pro-
vides, "The exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf must not infringe, or result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for
in this Convention." 9' While this language is derived from Article 5 of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 2 the words "must not infringe"
and the general reference to "rights and freedoms of other States" are new.
87 See 72 AJIL (1978), at pp. 76-77. 88 Ibid.
89 Report of the Chairman of the Third Committee, note 3 supra, Annex, Art. 246 bis.
90 See 73 AJIL (1979), at p. 22. 91 ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 78, para. 2.
92 Note 86 supra.
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The second problem with the "direct significance" standard derives from
the difficulty of ascertaining, with respect to the vast areas of the conti-
nental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone, when marine scientific
research on the shelf has direct significance in any practical sense for the
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources. Differences on the
matter were narrowed to a single issue: the exercise of discretion to with-
hold consent on resource grounds in areas beyond 200 miles. Requirements
for notification, obligations, consent, and the discretion to withhold con-
sent for one of the other specified reasons :,3 would not be changed. Dif-
ferences were further narrowed when it was granted, on the one hand,
that discretion to withhold consent on resource grounds would exist in
areas where exploitation was occurring or about to occur, and, on the
other hand, that it would not exist in areas where neither exploitation nor
exploration was occurring or about to occur.
The issue was thus narrowed to exploration. The difficulty is that the
term "exploration," when used in connection with the continental shelf,
may mean a variety of things; it can include activities of a general nature
covering very broad areas of the type referred to as "prospecting" in Annex
II in connection with deep seabed mining.9
4
Consideration was given to adopting the distinction between prospecting
and exploration elaborated in Annex II 95 for the purposes of applying
discretion to withhold consent on resource grounds beyond 200 miles.
However, some states noted that their mining systems would make this
distinction difficult to apply. It was revealed in the course of examining
these systems that exploratory drilling is a typical example of an activity
associated with an advanced stage of intensive, localized exploration
rather than a preliminary stage of general prospecting." This observation
laid the foundation for the compromise: discretion of the coastal state to
withhold its consent on resource grounds "shall be deferred and its consent
shall be implied" with respect to projects undertaken "outside specific
areas of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles . . . which the coastal state
has publicly designated as areas in which exploitation or exploratory opera-
tions, such as exploratory drilling are occurring or are about to occur." "
Publication of Results
The desire of states to restrict premature distribution of information
about their natural resources obviously runs directly counter to the prin-
ciple that the results of scientific research should be made available to all.
The treatment of this issue in the ICNT/Rev.1 was ambiguous and seemed
to encourage restraints on publication of all research results. The redraft
9 See note 83 .supra.
94 ICNT/Re% .I, Annex II, Article 2 refers to the "broad areas in which prospecting is
to take place."
Compare Arts. 2 and 3 of Ann. II.
This is generally the nature of the distinction made in Annex II and the national
mining systems on which it is based.
!,7 Report of the Chairman of the Third Committee, note 3 supra, Annex, Art. 246 bis.
9's See ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 249, paras. I(e) and 2.
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makes clear that since the coastal state can in its discretion withhold con-
sent for a project of direct significance for the exploration or exploitation
of natural resources, it can require, as a condition for granting such con-
sent, prior agreement on making the results internationally available 9
Settlement of Disputes
Two similar provisions of the ICNT/Rev.1, Articles 264 and 296, para-
graph 2, excluded from third-party adjudication or arbitration disputes
arising out of the exercise 'by the coastal state of a right or discretion under
Article 246 (the basic consent provision regarding the economic zone and
the continental shelf) or a decision by the coastal state to terminate a re-
search project under Article 253. Thus, a tribunal could not go beyond
ascertaining the existence in that case of a right or discretion to withhold
consent or a right to terminate a project.
The text in the chairman's report is designed to accommodate opponents
of this exclusion by providing for compulsory conciliation of the question
whether the coastal state is exercising these rights in a manner compatible
with provisions of the convention, "provided that the conciliation com-
mission shall not call in question the exercise of the discretion to withhold
consent in accordance with article 246, paragraph 4." 100 This, of course,
reflects the basic point that once it is established that the only issue relates
to a decision of a coastal state to withhold consent in the exercise of the
discretion conferred on it by the convention, there is no longer a substan-
tive basis in the convention itself for review, since it specifies no criteria
for the exercise of that discretion. On the other hand, termination of
a research project is subject to such third-party review.
Additional Clarifications
Several additional clarifications are included in the report. The coastal
state's right to suspend or terminate a project already under way on grounds
of variance from the project description is conditional on its not having
secured compliance within a reasonable time. 01 The change attests to
the fact that this power of the coastal state is considerably more onerous
than the power to deny consent before a project begins. There is also
an exhortation to facilitate access of marine scientific research vessels to
harbors. 0 2
Perhaps the most interesting addition is that in applying the scientific
research provisions, and "without prejudice to the rights and duties of
States" under the convention, a state "shall provide when appropriate
other States with a reasonable opportunity to obtain from it, or with its
co-operation, information necessary to prevent and control damage to the
99 Report of the Chairman of the Third Committee, note 3 supra, Annex, Art. 249.
Neither the ICNT nor the new text alters the obligations under sections 1 and 2 of
part XIII, including Article 244.
100 Report of the Chairman of the Third Committee, note 3 supra, Annex, Art. 264.
10 Id., Art. 253. -2 Id., Art. 255.
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health and safety of persons and the environment." 103 It is regrettably
characteristic of the sense of international solidarity of some of those con-
cerned with scientific research in this conference that an obligation to
provide merely a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain "necessary" informa-
tion already in existence, or by virtue of joint cooperation, and then with-
out prejudice to any coastal state rights, should only exist "when appro-
priate." Even if these last words are not clarified, they should be under-
stood in context as reflecting the general concern about good faith and
harassment that dominated all the science negotiations, that is, as requiring
the coastal state to respond positively to good faith requests whose impor-
tance is commensurate with the difficulties of supplying the information.
The words were not intended to nullify the entire article or duties im-
plied by other legal principles, such as those regarding protection of
health and the environment, to say nothing of the friendly relations of
states.
V. DELIMITATION BETWEEN STATES WITH OPPOSITE OR ADJACENT COASTS
The function of the provisions on the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf is to define the respective rights and duties of any coastal
state and all other states as a class in the same area. This relationship
is dealt with in considerable detail, constituting the essence of the so-called
package deal in this regard.
The question of the substantive rules governing delimitation between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts poses a different kind of issue.104
To the extent that the law of the sea allocates geographic jurisdiction to
the coastal state, how do neighboring coastal states divide areas of geo-
graphic jurisdiction?
There is a community interest in ensuring that they do so peacefully.
Moreover, important interests of states other than the coastal state depend
for their protection upon the exercise of the rights or fulfillment of the
duties of the coastal state. Protecting these interests could be difficult
in practice in areas where there is a dispute over which coastal state has
the right and responsibility to act.
The substance of this division, however, is of no concern to the class of
other states. No matter which area is assigned to which coastal state, the
rights and duties of both in relation to the international community as a
whole will be the same. In any given delimitation dispute between two
coastal states, some third state may believe its interests will best be served
103 Id., Art. 242.
1" The relevant ICNT/Rev.1 provisions, Article 74, paragraph 1 (economic zone)
and Article 83, paragraph 1 (continental shelf), use the same language. Different
language is used in ICNT/Rev.1, Article 15 regarding delimitation of the territorial
sea: this provision, now agreed, is substantially the same as the provision in Article
12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, note 22 supra.
While the ICNT retains the concept of the contiguous zone in Article 33, it does not
contain a delimitation provision that mentions the contiguous zone. Compare Art. 24,
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
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if a particular one of the two prevails, but this does not imply a substan-
tive interest on the part of the class of other states in the nature of the
delimitation.
The limits of coastal state jurisdiction specified by the convention with
respect to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 1'5 define
the maximum scope for competing coastal state claims. The basis for the
exercise of coastal state jurisdiction is the geographic relationship between
an offshore area and the coast. A comparative inquiry into the merits of
various claims, therefore, is focused on the nature of the geographic rela-
tionship to the coastlines of the respective coastal states.
When examined rigorously, all of the major positions on delimitation
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts proceed on the basis of
these premises.
Those who emphasize equidistance in effect wish to ensure not only
that delimitation is based upon the geographic relationship between the
offshore area in question and the respective coastlines, but that the most
significant geographic relationship is proximity. They nevertheless grant
that the equidistance method may not be applicable, for example, where
there are "special circumstances. " ""'
Those who emphasize equitable principles wish to see that all aspects
of the geographic relationship between the area in question and the respec-
tive coastal states are weighed, including, but not limited to, proximity.
The reference to equitable principles in the ICNT is understood to be a
reference to the criteria elaborated by the International Court of Justice
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 07  Those criterie. refer to the
geographic relationship between the area in dispute and the respective
coastal states. 18
Needless to say, such nuances of emphasis bear little relationship to the
practical matter of promoting agreement between the coastal states con-
cerned. They are relevant, if at all, to formal adjudication or arbitration.
It is reasonably clear, however, that the law of the sea convention will
not generally require arbitration or adjudication of delimitation disputes.
Moreover, the jurisprudence, scholarly writings, and state practice on off-
shore delimitation are growing rapidly. It is unlikely that a judge or arbi-
trator will be influenced more by the nuances of an inevw.tably flexible
sentence in a law of the sea convention than by the detailed guidance
afforded by learned jurists for analyzing the consequences of the specific
geographic circumstances before him.
The only issue seriously at stake that pertains to the substantive de-
limitation provisions is the :prospect for timely completion and widespread
10 5 ICNT/Rev.1, Arts. 57 and 76, respectively.
306' They apparently seek to place the burden of proof on the stal:e opposing the
application of equidistance. While they rely heavily on Article 6 of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf (note 86 supra) in this regard, it is doubtful that that
provision has this effect, since equidistance applies only "[i]n the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances."
107 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, [1969] ICJ REP 3.
108 Id., Judgment, para. 101, at 54.
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ratification of the convention on the law of the sea. No delimitation rule
stated in the convention can be applied directly to a dispute between
coastal states if one of them is not bound by the rule, either because it
refuses to ratify the convention, or because it successfully insists on a
right to reserve to the rule. Yet, experience with the Convention on the
Continental Shelf suggests that even if a right to reserve is included, the
substance of a delimitation provision may nevertheless discourage ratifica-
tion by some states. It is particularly important that the conference try
to avoid an approach to the delimitation problem that merely stimulates
demands for reservations to the other clauses as well.
Since flexibility is common to all the proposals, and since the under-
lying differences relate to emphasis, there would seem to be little point in
devoting much effort to a process that will inevitably result in the substi-
tution of one flexible formula for another flexible formula. The purpose
of including a substantive provision in the convention is to describe, and
thereby to narrow, the range of choices available. Those who would
emphasize equidistance are in effect arguing that the ICNT insufficiently
narrows those choices. Their efforts may become self-defeating, however,
if they press matters to the point where reservations become likely, since
reservations not only broaden the choices of the reserving state but also
make it less likely that a court will reach the conclusion that general inter-
national law imposes a narrow range of choices.
There was some discussion of means of indicating that the underlying
question is essentially one of the relative emphasis to be accorded the
various approaches to delimitation as they relate to particular circum-
stances and disputes. For example, a provision could be added to Articles
74 and 83 that expressly permits a state to file a formal declaration de-
scribing its position regarding the application of the principles referred
to in paragraph 1 of those articles. Such a declaration would qualify the
acceptance of those principles by a state, although it would not of course
prejudice the position of any other state.
In his report, the chairman of Negotiating Group 7 also refers to the
possibility of omitting any statement of the substantive rule and simply
providing for delimitation in accordance with international law. 10 9 Like
the reservation approach, this one does not bind the parties to a specific
statement of the governing principles, but like the declaration approach,
it constitutes a conventional affirmation that substantive rules of interna-
tional law govern and restrain the claims available in delimitation.11°
109 Note 3 supra.
"o The chairman of Negotiating Group 7 also refers to the fact that the idea of the
"equality of states" has been introduced in private discussion. Proceeding on the
assumption that this idea is suggested in connection with the existing ICNT text on
delimitation, several questions were nevertheless posed regarding the meaning of such
a reference. Clearly, it cannot mean that every state receives an economic zone or
continental shelf that is equal in size or value to the economic zone or continental shelf
of its neighbors. Coming, as it does, from equidistance advocates, it cannot mean
that delimitation is to be effected on a basis other than the geography of the area in
question. Sovereign equality of states and equidistance have nothing to do with each
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It is regrettable that the conference is facing choices of this sort. The
decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases made it impractical to attempt to state the rule in the language
of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. As is customary in the prepa-
ration of conventions of this sort, in drafting the basic rule for the original
Single Negotiating Text, the chairman of the Second Committee (then
Ambassador Galindo Pohl of El Salvador) looked to the language used
by the International Court of Justice for guidance."1 The initial attack
on this approach was made by a very few advocates of equidistance,
mainly states with small islands that were at that time uncertain of the
eventual outcome of negotiations regarding the provision on islands. 12
That attack stimulated a measure of partisan enthusiasm for and hostility
to the text that still plagues the conference but is in no sense merited by
the substance of the language itself.
VI. FiNAL CLAUSES
For the first time, the conference engaged in intensive work on the final
clauses of the convention. This work was concentrated in the Informal
Plenary on Final Clauses chaired by the president of the conference."13
In addition, the Informal Plenary established a Group of Legal Experts
under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jens Evensen of Norway; it has
referred issues to the group for drafting on which it has completed initial
debate.114 While the final clauses include provisions that are largely of
a technical and essentially noncontroversial character,"1 they also deal
with matters that can affect the substance of the convention and interna-
tional law, as well as matters that are politically controversial.
The president of the conference identified seven controversial items:
amendment or revision, reservations, relation to other conventions, entry
other. It would therefore seem, at least to this author, that the underlying purpose
must be to stress once again the notion that delimitation is to be effected on the basis
of principles of law, and not the relative military or economic power of the states con-
cerned. If this is the case, such a change would not seem to be worth stimulating
demands for reservations among supporters of the existing text.
"M Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (May 7, 1975),
Arts. 61 and 70, reprinted in 14 ILM 682 (1975). North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
note 107 supra, Judgment, para. 101, at 53. The reference to the use of the median
or equidistance line was added in the ISNT to the language used by the Court at that
point.
1.2 The text of ICNT/Rev.1, Article 121 has remained the same since the original
Single Negotiating Text. Opposition to the delimitation texts intensified after the re-
quirement that the median or equidistance line should be applied provisionally was
deleted in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT). Since the reason was that
"the Conference may not adopt a compulsory jurisdictional procedure for the settle-
ment of delimitation disputes" (RSNT, part II, Introductory Note, para. 12), it is
not clear what role positions regarding dispute settlement played in this reaction.
"13 Alternative texts and notes prepared by the Secretariat in 1976 tended to focus
discussion. 6 OFF. REc. 125 (1976).
114 Conf. Doe. FC/2 (July 27, 1979).
"15The Chairman of the Group of Legal Experts has submitted a text on these,
Conf. Doe. FC/16 (Aug. 23, 1979).
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into force (including consideration of a preparatory commission), transi-
tional provision, denunciation, and participation in the convention.", He
pointed out that the existing ICNT contains provisions addressed to only
two of these issues, namely, entry into force 17 and the "transitional pro-
vision" that appears after the text.l"$
At the outset of the debate, the president stressed three objectives bear-
ing on the preparation of final clauses:
Our prime concern is the establishment of a completely integrated
legal order for the use of the oceans and its resources and potential.
All else must be subordinated to and subserve this purpose. This is
the function of the Preamble and the Final Clauses. They must not
be allowed to create such contention as would obscure and obstruct
the overriding objective, hamper the work of the Conference and
imperil our chances of success.
We must seek to preserve intact, and protect, the efficacy and dura-
bility of the body of law which we are trying to create in the form of
a Convention encompassing all issues and problems relating to the
law of the sea as a package comprising certain elements that consti-
tute a single and indivisible entity.
We must seek to attract the most extensive and representative de-
gree of ratification and the earliest possible entry into force of the
new Convention.
The second objective that I have specified here cannot be achieved
if we expose the essential unity and coherence of the new body of
law to the danger of impairment through the unrestricted exercise of
the right of reservation.
We must seek to ensure for all States Parties to the Convention the
highest attainable degree of clarity and certainty as to their rights
and obligations under the Convention.
We must at the same time provide some measure of flexibility which
would serve as an insurance against future erosion of the Convention
and which would underpin rather than undermine the structure.119
While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 120 had not yet
entered into force, and in any event had not been ratified by a large ma-
jority of the states participating in the conference, it did constitute the
point of departure for discussion and analysis of various problems. The
issue discussed in many cases was whether it was desirable to provide for
a result different from, or with more specificity than, that produced by
the rules of the Vienna Convention applicable to a treaty that is silent
on the point. It was generally recognized that the comprehensive scope
of the law of the sea convention, including its constitutive aspects, neces-
sitated some special treatment of these matters.
116Con. Doe. FC/I (July 23, 1979). 117ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 301.
1'- UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1, at 139-40 (English).
I19 Conf. Doe. FC/1, note 116 supra.
120 UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679
(1969).
19801
THE AMEUICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [
Amendment or Revision
The basic question posed on this subject was whether the convention
should include procedures for amendment or a general review of its pro-
visions, in addition to the review of the deep seabed mining regime con-
templated in Article 155.121 It was pointed out that as a legal matter,
protocols to the convention could be agreed by the parties at any time,
and that either the parties or the UN General Assembly could call a con-
ference if necessary at any time.
The question of primary juridical significance about provisions on amend-
ments is whether an amendment may enter into force before it has been
ratified by all the states parties. Many of the constituent elements of the
overall consensus were specifically designed to accommodate the priorities
of various minorities of states. Thus, the underlying balance and complex
structure of the overall "package deal" could be altered if any of these
elements could be changed without the assent of the affected minorities.
This problem gave rise to suggestions that one might distinguish between
technical and other amendments (including the first of several references
to an expanded concept of jus cogens that will be addressed later in this
discussion). It also gave rise to proposals for qualified majorities for all
amendments to enter into force, including acceptance by different groups
for different parts of the convention . 22
Of course, the possibility that an amendment might enter into force over
the objection of a state party raises the fundamental question whether that
state is bound by the amendment. There was support for the view that
the amendment does not apply to that state's relations with other parties.1 23
While a possible, if less than desirable, substantive result in some cases,
this approach presents structural difficulties in connection 'with the Seabed
Authority and other institutions such as the Law of the Sea Tribunal. It
was recognized that to the extent that an amendment must bind all parties
or none, the basic choices are either to preclude the amendment from
entering into force in the event of an objection or to expect that the ob-
jecting state might exercise its right to withdraw.
Reservations
The comments of the president of the conference 124 foreshadowed sub-
stantial concern among delegations aboit the effect of reservations on
221 Conf. Doc. FC/4 (Aug. 1, 1979) contains the president's summary of the debate
on amendment and revision.
122One interesting idea would avoid the difficulty of identifying substantive groups
by precluding entry into force of an amendment if a state previously declared that its
substantial interests were directly affected and that it could not ratify the amendment.
Any party could invoke the dispute settlement procedures of the convention to chal-
lenge the conclusion of the *state that its substantial interests were directly affected.
Conf. Doc. GLE/FC/10 (Aug. 23, 1979).
123 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 120 supra, Art. 30, para.
4(b) and Art. 40, para. 4.
124 See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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the integrity of the accommodations incorporated in the "package deal."
There was no support for the idea that all articles of the convention should
be subject to reservations. There also seemed to be little if any support
for the option of remaining silent on the question of reservations. 25
Even if it were agreed that the relevant rules of international law are
those specified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
effect of omitting any clause on reservations would be unclear. The gen-
eral rule in the Vienna Convention applicable to a treaty that does not
deal with the issue is that a state may formulate a reservation unless that
reservation "is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." 126
To interpret and apply the "object and purpose" criterion in the case of
any given article of the vast and complex law of the sea convention would
be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.
The number of issues covered by the convention is legion, the differing
priorities attached to them by different states almost infinite, and the
number of states participating in the negotiation greater than ever before
in history. It would in one sense be difficult to maintain that any par-
ticular reservation to any particular subparagraph of any particular article
is contrary to the object and purpose of a huge convention of over three
hundred articles and several annexes covering many subjects. On the
other hand, it is likely that any attempt to achieve a consensus at the
conference on the object and purpose of the convention would end, after
a long period of time, with the verbatim repetition of almost every
provision.
While a few delegations that have never been sympathetic to the con-
vention did argue for liberal rules regarding reservations, it seems likely that
the basic choice facing the conference is between a prohibition on all
reservations and a prohibition on almost all reservations. As one may
rightly deduce from the remarks of the president and almost all delega-
tions over the years, the underlying object and purpose of the convention
is not so much its substance as widespread agreement on a comprehensive
regime for the oceans embracing all interests at stake. With few excep-
tions, if any, it is difficult to conceive of reservations compatible with that
object and purpose.'27
1.-5 Conf. Doe. FC/6 (Aug. 7, 1979) contains the president's summary of the debate
on reservations.
126 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 120 supra, Art. 19.
Reservations to the constituent instrument of an international organization require
the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization. Id., Art. 20. How much
of parts XI (deep seabeds), XV (settlement of disputes), and related annexes are cov-
ered by this rule? In the case of the Seabed Authority, what is the competent organ?
127 In some instances, the positive benefit of promoting widespread ratification out-
weighs the substantive cost of permitting a particular reservation. As already noted,
this category may include the substantive provisions regarding delimitation of the
economic zone and continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.
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Relation to Other Conventions
The question of relation to other conventions 121 stirred some theoretical
debate regarding the status of the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea
after the entry into force of the new Law of the Sea Convention.1 20  This
debate implicitly concerned the value of the 1958 conventions as evidence
of customary international law.
130
Another interesting question is posed by the need to refer to the relevant
rules and principles of the law of the sea in the course of applying general
multilateral conventions on other subjects. There was no dissent from
the point that the establishment of the economic zone does not alter or re-
lieve flag states or coastal states of their obligations under existing conven-
tions regulating navigation and overflight beyond the territorial sea (without
prejudice to coastal states' environmental rights under the new Law of the
Sea Convention) .131 In this connection it was noted, for example, that
Article 12 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation,13 2 under which
exclusively international regulations apply to civil aviation over the high
seas, would continue to have exactly the same effect with respect to the
exercise of freedom of overflight in the exclusive economic zone, despite
the changes in terminology for the geographic areas in question. 133 It was
also noted that the new Law of the Sea Convention should not: be regarded
as altering the obligations of the parties to bilateral and multilateral treaties
dealing with specific activities or areas.
Entry Into Force
Discussion of this item centered largely on the number of parties neces-
sary for the convention to enter into force.'13 4 A basic question raised was
128 Conf. Doc. FC/7 (Aug. 9, 1979) contains the president's summary of the debate
on relation to other conventions. See ICNT/Rev.1, Arts. 35(c), 51(1), 74(5), 83(4),
282, and 283 in this connection.
129 Virtually all of the provisions of the 1958 conventions are either repeated, modi-
fied, or replaced by the provisions of the ICNT/Rev.1.
130 This matter will be discussed further in connection with the question of ins
cogens.
131 See Conf. Doc. GLE/FC/9 (Aug. 20, 1979).
132 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, note 49 supra.
13 3 See Conf. Doc. FC/7, note 128 supra. Two provisions of the ICNT/Rev.1 are
directed to this kind of problem. Article 58 preserves within the economic zone "the
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight." Article 87 is the
provision enumerating the freedoms of the high seas. Article 86, dealing with the
application of the high seas provisions, is not a definition, and expressly states that it
"does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all states in the exclusive
economic zone in accordance with article 58." The ICAO question wits one of those
that led to the adoption of the quoted terms. The author notes this point in 72 AJIL
at p. 69 and note 45 thereof in explaining them, referring generally to "insufficiently
informed oral remarks of employees of certain nonmaritime specialized agencies" as
one of the reasons for the clarification of the text regarding freedom of navigation and
overflight in the economic zone.
134 Coed. Does. FC/9 (Aug. 14, 1979) and FC/11 (Aug. 16, 1979) contain the
president's summary of the debates on entry into force.
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whether the requirement should simply be quantitative, or should refer to
particular categories of states as well. The relevance of the composition
and voting structure of the Council of the Seabed Authority was noted in
this regard.
There was widespread support for establishing a preparatory commission
prior to the entry into force of the convention. Its principal responsibility
would be to draft the initial rules, regulations, and procedures for deep
seabed mining. It was emphasized that such a commission would have
preparatory functions only and would not be an interim seabed authority
with the power to conduct or authorize mining.
135
The idea of permitting states to accept the convention provisionally was
also discussed.t36 While there were substantial doubts about this ap-
proach, it was widely agreed that should it be adopted, provisional ac-
ceptance would have to apply to the entire convention under the same con-
ditions as permanent acceptance. The difference is that a state would cease
to be a provisional party at such time as it decided not to become a perma-
nent party. 37
The main reason advanced for permitting provisional acceptance is that
it would encourage more rapid and widespread acceptance of the conven-
tion. For some countries, some of the time-consuming formalities of
permanent acceptance might not apply. For others, where the executive
would not act alone, the need for provisional approval only might facilitate
consideration of the convention and help significantly to overcome fears of
the unknown that could prevent its permanent acceptance.
Denunciation
The question of denunciation did not stimulate extensive debate.1-3
Among the grounds proffered for denunciation were the entry into force
of binding amendments or regulations over the objection of a state. The
general view was that every state retained the sovereign right to withdraw
from a convention of this sort, although such withdrawal would not affect
its obligations under customary international law. 139 Reference was made
to the declaration of the San Francisco Conference confirming the right to
withdraw from the United Nations despite the absence of a Charter provi-
135 Conf. Docs. FC/8 (Aug. 13, 1979) and FC/8/Add.1 (Aug. 10, 1979) contain
a Secretariat study of instruments establishing preparatory bodies. It will be con-
sidered at the start of the next session.
136 The Secretariat recirculated its study of provisional application, UN Doe. A/AC.
138/88 (June 12, 1973).
13 During the discussion of ratification in the Group of Legal Experts on Final
Clauses, it was pointed out that signature alone would not bind a state to the provi-
sions of the treaty, and that the principle of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (note 120 supra) would not have either this effect or the effect of
impairing the rights and obligations of states under the existing international law of
the sea and treaties.
M, Conf. Doe. FC/13 contains the president's summary of the debate on denunciation.
M , See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 120 supra, Art. 43.
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sion on the subject. 40 A general view seemed to be emerging that a spe-
cific provision on denunciation should be included.
Jus Cogens
One of the novel aspects of the discussion of final clauses was the intro-
duction of the concept of jus cogens. As used in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the concept refers to a peremptory norm of inter-
national law that voids any inconsistent treaty.141
When informal debate on final clauses was being organized, representa-
tives of the Group of 77 indicated that certain of its members wished to
have "jus cogens" added to the list of issues. It was understood that debate
on the matter would be permitted. As might be expected, references to
]us cogens in the course of discussion of final clauses were rarely confined
to the concept as it is understood and used in the Vienna Convention, since
it is questionable whether a treaty provision can, as such, create a rule of
ius cogens in that sense. -42
Tus cogens was mentioned in connection with three distinct questions.
The first was whether to prepare an article that would identify principles or
provisions that would not be subject to amendment or reservations; the en-
trenched concepts governing the deep seabed review conference under
Article 155 were cited as an example. The second was whether an amend-
ment or reservation would be effective (at least with respect to an objecting
state) if the convention were silent on amendment and reservations. The
third, perhaps the most subtle, explored whether provisions of the law of
the sea convention would be regarded as declaratory of international law.
Because it may be argued that subjecting a provision to reservations, and
perhaps amendment, weakens the case for regarding it as declaratory of
international law, there is a reluctance to permit reservations or easy
amendment that transcends the effect on the convention as a treaty. Indeed,
the psychological impact of the arguments advanced by the International
Court of Justice to distinguish between the lawmaking character of Articles
I to 3 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the contractual char-
acter of Article 6 of that convention has been substantial.143 The widespread
use of cross-references in the ICNT is designed to discourage a court from
concluding that a general provision is declaratory of international law
while the details that made agreement on that provision possible are not.
It is conceivable that many states would sooner see the conference fail than
permit a text to emerge that allows reservations in connection with priority
provisions they regard, or plan to regard, as declaratory of international law.
One ingenious argument made by a prospective seabed mining state against
permitting provisional application of the convention was that it was incom-
140 Doe. 1210, P/20, I UNCIO Does. 612, 615-17, 619-20 (1945).
141 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 120 supra, Arts. 53 and 64.
142 It can be argued that even Article 103 of the UN Charter as such binds only
UN members.
143 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, [1969] ICJ REP. 28-42, paras. 37-72.
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patible with the status of the substantive provisions, other than those deal-
ing with the deep seabeds, as new customary law.
As already noted, the question of the relationship between the new con-
vention and the 1958 conventions is in essence another aspect of the
customary law question. The strictly legal point that, to the extent they
are inconsistent, the new convention supplants the old conventions as be-
tween the parties to both was not contested, and was not really the issue.
At the start of the law of the sea negotiations, a leading coastal state par-
ticipant said, "I come to bur), Grotius, not to praise him." This spirit informs
revived attempts to reduce if not eliminate the value of the 1958 conven-
tions as evidence of customary law and substitute the new convention for
them (which, incidentally, seems in the end to provide a more solid founda-
tion for preserving high seas freedoms under modem conditions). As a
consensus nears on the noninstitutional parts of the ICNT that are amenable
to implementation without a treaty, and as more and more of these provi-
sions become the basis in fact for state practice, there is considerably less
resistance to the idea. Needless to say, nothing the convention text says
can make it declaratory of customary law, but evidence of the intent of the
conference may be relevant.
The question of the relationship between the law of the sea convention
and subsequent inconsistent agreements among some of the parties presents
the same issue dealt with in Article 103 of the UN Charter. It closely re-
sembles the concept of jus cogens as presented in the Vienna Convention,
but is in fact a question of modifying obligations under multilateral treaties
between certain parties only. Article 41 of the Vienna Convention pre-
cludes such modifications if they affect the other parties' rights or are
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the
treaty as a whole. This question has been raised in a proposal by Chile 144
that attempts to make the principle of the common heritage of mankind
a true peremptory norm of international law, rendering conflicting agree-
ments invalid. As a practical matter, it seems highly unlikely that states,
while parties to the law of the sea convention, would expose themselves
to the sanctions available under the convention by ,entering into subsequent
conflicting agreements regarding seabed mining.
One may also ask whether there is any sense in having a major theoretical
argument over the issue. A peremptory norm of international law must
in the first place be a norm of international law. Were the states principally
interested in deep seabed mining to find the implementation of the treaty
regime intolerably incompatible with their expectations, and withdraw
and proceed with mining on a different basis, an assertion that they are
violating customary international law would have the same significance
144 Conf. Doe. FC/14 (Aug. 29, 1979) proposes the following text:
The States Parties to the present Convention accept and recognize on behalf of
the international community as a whole that the provision relating to the common
heritage of mankind set out in article 136 is a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law from which no derogation is permitted and which, consequently, can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
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whether or not the convention contains a clause such as that proposed
by Chile.1
45
Should it come to pass that Chile is not persuaded by such arguments or
loses control of its proposal, the addition of a veritable Christmas treeful
of ornaments seems possible. What are the implications of declaring the
principle of the common heritage a peremptory norm of international law,
but not the principle of the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the
natural resources of the economic zone or the continental shelf? What of
the freedoms of navigation and overflight, or the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment? In the end, something close to a table
of contents of the convention might emerge, as occurred in the discussions
of such matters during the debate on amendments. 146  Would this result be
any different from relying on the rules in Articles 41 and 43 of the Vienna
Convention?
Participation and the Transitional Provision
The discussion of participation in the convention, presumably including
the right to become a party with the same rights and duties as all other
parties, proved to be exceedingly politicized.14r While it is generally ac-
cepted that all states would be permitted to become parties to the conven-
tion, and that the "all states" clause would be administered by the United
Nations in the same manner as with respect to other treaties, various pro-
posals were also made to permit other entities to become parties, including:
the European Economic Community and similar regional economic com-
munities; 148 fully self-governing associated states that choose that status in
145 It should be noted that an interpretation of the common heritage principle that
takes adequate account of the world's needs for raw materials at reasonable prices and
the interests of developing countries in deriving financial benefits from deep seabed
mining might well preclude restrictive commodity agreements affecting the supply,
marketing, or prices of any metal mined from the deep seabeds.
1
4 6 See Conf. Doc. FC/4 (Aug. 1, 1979).
147Conf. Does. FC/13 (Aug. 20, 1979) and FC/17 (Aug. 23, 1979) contain the
president's summary of the debates on participation in the convention.
1
48 Conf. Doc. FC/5 (Aug. 3, 1979), repeating the text in UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
L.32 (Sept. 14, 1978).
Utilization and conservation of living resources, some aspects of the proposed deep
seabed mining regime, protection of the marine environment, and potentially transport
and energy have been mentioned as matters within the competence of the EEC for
these purposes. Koers, Participation of the European Economic Community in a New
Law of the Sea Convention, 73 AJIL 426 (1979). With respect to the Seabed Au-
thority, Koers notes that EEC participation "in the Assembly (and othex organs) will,
of course, require special voting arrangements." Id. at 434. Were this a reference to
the Council, it would certainly be an understatement. Current approaches would
give each Council member one vote and rely on the number of votes necessary to
prevent action as the basis for protecting seabed mining and consumer :nterests. The
"blocking" numbers discussed proceed on the assumption that seabed mining and
consumer states that are members of the EEC would qualify and vote separately.
An informal proposal by the USSR (Conf. Doc. FC/3 (July 30, 1979)) takes a
more general approach to the question of international organizations with competence
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an act of self-determination supervised and approved by the United Nations
and that have full legal and administrative competence regarding the sub-
ject matter of the convention (i.e., the Cook Islands and Niue supported by
New Zealand, the state with which they are associated); 1,9 the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands; 15o any territory that has not attained full inde-
pendence in accordance with Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General As-
sembly; -" an), national liberation movement recognized by the United
Nations and the regional intergovernmental organization concerned.'52
The first two of these can be viewed as special problems of applying the
"all states" concept. It might be possible to permit such entities to accept
the convention in connection with an all states clause, since both are exer-
cising the competence of states in their stead.
Some careful work will be required to ensure that any arrangements in
this regard do not permit a state to enjoy the benefits of a party with respect
to some matters covered by the convention, but without assuming the ob-
ligations entailed in other parts of the convention. If an economic com-
munity may become a party only with respect to matters within its com-
petence, a serious question arises as to whether it should be permitted to
exercise the rights of a party with respect to areas and nationals of a member
state that has not assumed the obligations of the convention for matters that
are not within the competence of the community. The question is a variant
of the problem of reservations.
In this connection, the European Court of Justice has said:
It is further important to state, as was correctly pointed out by the
Commission, that it is not necessary to set out and determine, as re-
gards other parties to the Convention, the division of powers in this
respect between the Community and the Member States, particularly
as it may change in the course of time. It is sufficient to state to the
other contracting parties that the matter gives rise to a division of
powers within the Community, it being understood that the exact
nature of that division is a domestic question in which third parties
have no need to intervene. In the present instance the important
in matters dealt with by the convention. It provides:
1. If an international organization established by States conducts activities in
one or several spheres regulated by the provisions of this Convention, references
to States in the corresponding provisions of the Convention shall be deemed to
apply to such an organization, on condition that it declares its acceptance of the
rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. States Parties to this Convention which are members of such an organization
shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes a declaration
in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
Compare Art. 22, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, 1972, 24 UST 2389, TIAS No. 7762.
' 4 Conf. Doe. FC/10 (Aug. 15, 1979).
1',o Statement and Informal Proposal of the Federated States of Micronesia (Aug. 23,
1979).
151 Conf. Doc. FC/12 (Aug. 16, 1979). 152Ibid.
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thing is that the implementation of the Convention should not be
incomplete.15'
The question of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is largely re-
solved by the anticipation that associated states 1" will emerge with the
necessary internal and external competence to become parties upon termina-
tion of the Trust.
The most serious controversy surrounds the last two kinds of entities.
The problem of dependencies also arises in the context of the so-called
transitional provision."' That provision states that resource rights of vari-
ous dependent territories or territories under foreign occupation or colonial
domination "shall be vested in the inhabitants of that territory, to be ex-
ercised by them for their own benefit." A "metropolitan or foreign power...
may not in any case exercise, profit or benefit from or in any way infringe"
these rights. In addition, in cases of a dispute over the sovereignty of a
territory, if the United Nations "has recommended specific means of solu-
tion," these rights "may not be exercised except with the prio consent of
the parties to the dispute." 156
While large numbers of delegations are required for political reasons to
make positive statements on dependencies and liberation movements for the
record, it is generally understood at the conference that their inclusion could
wreck the prospects for ratification of the convention. Whether there is
anything to be gained from pressing the issue might be analyzed by
examining some of the main objectives that may be involved: legal rights
as parties to the convention, protection of the inhabitants of dependencies
and occupied territories, and political recognition.
Two distinct questions are involved. First, what state is internationally
responsible in fact for ensuring compliance with international law (includ-
ing the convention) in the offshore areas in question? Second, what are its
special duties as regards the present and future interests of the inhabitants?
If one approaches the matter in terms of who should be in control of an
area rather than who is in control, both of these questions become irrelevant.
The only question then is whether it is considered desirable to prejudice
the effective entry into force of the convention.
Seen in this context, exercising the legal rights and having the legal duties
of a party to the convention becomes a problem only in a few cases where
the relationship with a state is so distinctive, and the independent powers
of the dependency over its territory so extensive, that a serious practical
question of which entity should exercise the rights and duties under the
"' Ruling on Participation of Member States of European Atomic Energy Com-
munity in Convention Relating to Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in Absence
of Concurrent Participation of the Community, 21 O.J. Eun. Com. (No. C 302)
para. 35 (1978), 18 ILM 85, 101 (1979).
"54 Outside the Mariana Islands.
55 Conf. Doc. FC/11 (Aug. 16, 1979) contains the president's summary of the
debate on the transitional provision.
15rThe transitional provision was removed from the treaty articles in the RSNT.
It was Article 136 of the SNT.
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convention arises in the opinion of both the state and the dependency.
The primary objective seems to be the independent exercise of legal rights
with respect to coastal resources, especially in the economic zone and on
the continental shelf. In these special cases (e.g., the associated states that
will emerge in Micronesia after termination of the Trust, the Cook Islands,
and Niue) the three common elements are: an independent local govern-
ment actually exercising comprehensive territorial competence over matters
dealt with by the convention, external competence of that government to
enter into international agreements on such matters, and recognition of such
internal and external competence by the state with which that government
is associated. Two theoretical options arise in such cases: to treat such as-
sociated states as parties with respect to some matters (e.g., coastal state
rights and duties), or to treat them as parties with respect to all matters
(including "flags" and membership in the Seabed Authority).
As for liberation movements, the underlying objective seems to be to
enhance their political recognition. They cannot, and apparently do not
wish to, claim economic zones, mine the seabeds on their own, sail ships
under their flag, and so forth,157 at least until they form governments-at
which point the legal issue becomes one of recognition of states and govern-
ments, not one of liberation movements. Indeed, a liberation movement
would presumably refuse to concede that it might not yet be a national
government by the time there are substantial revenues generated from
deep seabed mining. In brief, there is no substantial legal point related
to the convention in pressing the issue of permitting liberation movements
to become parties to it.
The fact that the latest proposal on liberation movements is couched in
terms of accession rather than signature suggests a refined appreciation of
the problem.' - Be that as it may, the real problem is that the law of the
sea convention cannot be the testing ground for new and controversial de-
velopments on the issue. The attempt could wreck the conference; victory
could wreck the convention. To put it mildly, the idea of requiring formal
recognition of or a commitment to finance certain liberation movements as
the price for a law of the sea convention substantially miscalculates the
political equation.
Of course, the advocates of permitting liberation movements to become
parties may be making an underlying point-unrelated to the law of the
sea convention as such-regarding the lawfulness of the physical control
being exercised over the land territories sought to be liberated. This ques-
tion is of the same genre as that adverted to for disputed areas in the pro-
posed transitional provision. It is not a law of the sea question at all; in-
157 The basic juridical provisions refer, necessarily, to states. "Among the relevant
provisions cited were articles 2, 3, 17, 21, 24, 25, 33, 38, 41, 42, 47, 49, 53, 54,
56, 60, 61, 62, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 83, 87, 90, 91, 94, 105, 106, 107, 125, 130, 153,
156, 159, 161, 192, 193, 194, 211, 217, 218, 220, 226, 228, 234, 235, 245, 246, 279 and
287 of the ICNT/Rev.I." President's Note, Informal Plenary on Final Clauses, Conf.
Doe. FC/17 (Aug. 23, 1979), para. 2.
15' Conf. Doc. FC/12 (Aug. 16, 1979).
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deed, the law of the sea aspect derives completely from the position taken
regarding land territory. States that do not recognize the validity of claims
to or occupation of territories may maintain the same position regarding
claims of right under the convention in respect of those territories (e.g.,
territorial sea, continental shelf, or economic zone claims).
The basic problem appears to be common to all areas arguably under
"foreign" control: the use, allocation, and depletion of natural resources off
the coast of dependencies or areas under military occupation. (At least
one of the above rubrics presumably covers "foreign"-controlled "disputed
areas," as well as areas sought to be freed by the relevant national libera-
tion movements.)
It seems fruitless to approach this issue in terms of who has the right to
supervise (administer) resource activities. It is the fact of "foreign" or
"metropolitan" administration on the coast, whether lawful or not, that
gives rise to the problem. The practical question is: even if its presence is
lawful, what are the obligations of a foreign or metropolitan power regard-
ing local inhabitants? No obligations can be imposed in practice if their
effectiveness is dependent upon an admission by a power that its claim and
presence are illegal.
In the case of military occupation, it seems clear that the traditional pro-
tections afforded inhabitants by international law and the Hague and Red
Cross Conventions should apply to offshore resources of the coastal state.
These rules impose very substantial limitations on the occupying power.'"'
For dependencies, the requirements of existing international law may be
different, but they are no less solemn. The language of chapter XI of the
UN Charter seems more protective of the inhabitants and is free of the legal
problems of the proposed transitional provision.1 0
The convention need say nothing at all to preserve these protections
under the Charter and other rules of international law. This is made
abundantly clear by the preamble of the ICNT,10 not to mention Article
103 of the Charter. Indeed, several legal problems would be created by
treating the matter in the convention itself.
If the conference attempts to state the applicable substantive rules, it
runs the risk of dividing and confusing another body of international law.
259 The application to continental shelf resources of the relevant restraints of inter-
national law on the occupying power is not contested. See U.S. Dept. of State, Memo-
randum of Law on Israel's Right to Develop Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez
(Oct. 1, 1976), 16 ILM 733 (1977). Israel's response, while differing on the effect
of the relevant rules, states: "The duty of an occupant is inter alia to maintain eco-
nomic prosperity of occupied territory." While "reasonable exploitation" is in its
view permitted, "waste or excessive extraction" are not. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Memorandum of the Law on the Right to Develop New Oil Fields in the Sinai (Aug.
1, 1977), 17 ILM 432, 443 (1978).
160 Some of the problems are discussed in 69 AJIL (1975) at pp. 786-87 (regarding
SNT Art. 136).
161. The last preambular paragraph of the ICNT/Rev.1 affirms that "the rules of cus-
tomary international law continue to govern matters not expressly regulated by the
provisions of this Convention."
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In order to avoid leaving something out, it must either draft beyond its
expertise (and mandate) or make a general cross-reference to international
law. This also raises the possible implication that these other rules of in-
ternational law would apply offshore only by virtue of, or to parties to, the
law of the sea convention. Since fisheries zones and continental shelves
already exist, and problems may arise before the convention enters into
force, that is an undesirable result.
In addition, it should be noted that the interpretation and application
of any such clause would inevitably involve very sensitive political issues.
For example, how many states would delegate to the UN General Assembly
the power to determine whether part of what they consider their territory
is in reality, at least for purposes of the convention, an area under foreign
occupation or colonial domination? With respect to judicial or arbitral con-
sideration of such matters, it is instructive to note the strong resistance to
the ICNT requirement for adjudication or arbitration even of offshore
boundaries, and the fact that even though the ICNT would require some
third-party procedure on offshore delimitation entailing a binding decision,
it provides that "such procedure or decision shall exclude the determination
of any claim to sovereignty or other rights with respect to continental or
insular land territory." 162
Thus, inclusion of a clause on this subject would inevitably produce de-
mands for an exclusion from compulsory third-party dispute settlement pro-
cedures and a right to reserve to the clause. Such demands would threaten
a broader reopening of the question of exceptions to dispute settlement and
would hinder attempts to limit reservations generally. If, as seems likely,
reservations would be the end result, inclusion of a clause accomplishes
nothing as a matter of treaty law and casts doubt upon its value as evi-
dence of customary law.
VII. CONCLUSION: PROsPECrS FOR THE NINTH SESSION
The three major obstacles that must be overcome to achieve a treaty are
the remaining unresolved deep seabed mining issues, including voting in the
Authority; the politically inspired proposals regarding dependencies and
national liberation movements; and the pitfalls of formal procedures. A
significant testimony to the extraordinary progress made by the conference
is that the second and in some measure the third of these have nothing to
do with the substance of the law of the sea and involve problems wholly
extraneous to it. Nevertheless, only a considerable and probably enhanced
determination by important conference leaders to resolve the problems and
to protect the convention from slow but mortal unraveling is likely to over-
come these obstacles and to see the conference through to a successful con-
clusion in the year or so envisaged. Those who have relaxed and enjoyed
the fray for so long on the assumption that the ICNT is already international
law should take serious note of the fact that there are now voices calling it
only a stage in the development of the law that should be followed by new,
16ICNT/Rev.1, Art. 298, para. 1(a).
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inconsistent unilateral actions, such as demands that requests be made of
coastal states for permission to navigate in the economic zone.,6
It is difficult to deal with the view that, in the end, this prccedurally in-
novative, informal, marathon conference must formally adopt texts according
to the procedures sanctified by tradition and its Rules of Procedure. Some
holding this view participated in other conferences where formal procedures
such as voting on individual amendments and articles both in committee
and plenary were in fact employed. Others have spent much of their careers
working on resolutions of the UN General Assembly rather than legally bind-
ing treaties that must be submitted to governments for ratification. Yet the
emphasis on the integrity of the "package deal" that dominated the debate
in the Informal Plenary on questions such as amendments to the convention
after ratification must also be maintained during the formal stages of the
conference. 1 4 Without doubt, the Rules of Procedure 211 must be re-
spected; but that includes the gentleman's agreement on consensus pro-
cedures. 6
To produce a widely acceptable law of the sea convention, there will have
to be a working consensus on the final informal text (subject perhaps to
additional scrutiny by the Drafting Committee). That final informal text
will have to become the Convention on the Law of the Sea, no matter how
many intermediate stages it passes through along the way. There could no
longer be any changes of substance that affect the consensus.
Voting on individual amendments, individual articles, or even individual
parts risks destroying the convention. Admittedly, the danger of voting
on amendments is greater in committee than in Plenary,'7 and the danger of
163 This theme was resoundingly pressed by three distinguished Nova Scotia lawyers,
Professors Gold, Flemming, and Johnston, at the 13th Annual Meeting of the Law of
the Sea Institute in Mexico City in October 1979. Their remarks will be published
in the Proceedings. These lawyers-albeit unwittingly-have posed fundamental
questions about the willingness of informed members of the Canadian public to support
the integrity of the Canadian side of the massive and revolutionary bargains on both
freedom of navigation and coastal state pollution controls struck with the rest of the
world. The broader question is the conclusion states will draw about the possibilities
for serious negotiation in the future.
164 The procedural and substantive implications 6f the "package deal" approach to
the negotiations are the subject of an illuminating essay by the leader of the French
delegation, Guy Ladreit de Lacharrikre, in Aspects juridiques de la ndgotiation sur un
"package deal" d la Conference des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, in ESSAYS
iN HONOR OF ERtm CAsra, (Publications of the Finnish Branch of the International
Law Association No. 2, Helsinki 1979).
L6.5 Note 14 supra.
166Appended to the Rules of Procedure, reprinted in 73 AJIL 3 n.11 (1979).
167 In a main committee, a determination that all efforts at consensus have been ex-
hausted can be made, and an amendment can be adopted, by a majority of those pres-
ent and voting; the "cooling-off period" during which a vote can be deferred is 5 days.
Rules of Procedure, note 14 supra, rule 55. In Plenary, the requisite raajority is two-'
thirds of those present and voting, provided that majority includes at least a majority
of the states participating in that session of the conference (something on the order of
75 affirmative votes at a minimum); the "cooling-off period" is 10 days. Rules 37
and 39.
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voting on articles may be greater than the danger of voting on amendments.
Since the informal texts are plenary documents issued on the joint re-
sponsibility of the president and the chairmen, it would make sense to con-
centrate formal proceedings in the Plenary, at least insofar as any decisions
are concerned. 1 " But still, the very idea of voting is fundamentally in-
compatible not only with the concept of consensus but with the preservation
of the "package deal" and the view that the noninstitutional aspects of the
convention are the most authoritative evidence of modem international law.
This approach has been questioned on the ground that the absence of
records regarding the substantive negotiations makes it difficult for delega-
tions to convince their governments or domestic public opinion that they
have in fact made every effort to achieve changes in the text, and have not
succeeded. However, politically astute groups able to bring substantial
pressure to bear on their delegations are probably well aware of the fact
that the time for making maximum efforts for changes is prior to completion
of an informal text, not afterwards. Accordingly, the main function of
the formal stage of the conference would seem to be to afford an oppor-
tunity for states to record their preferences and disappointments. Even
such a procedure has the inherent danger of stimulating exchanges on ques-
tions of interpretation that could undermine the fragile agreements of which
the overall consensus is composed. It was suggested that delegations be
encouraged to circulate their statements in writing rather than deliver them
orally.
The "'balance" of the convention is so delicate, and the web of implicit
bargains and complex relationships so opaque, that any attempt to take
serious action on the premise that no article has been agreed would surely
prove as destructive as it is naive. The only sure defense against the various
risks that will arise during formal proceedings is the existence of a large
enough group of sophisticated delegations that is prepared, as a matter of
principle, to oppose every procedural or substantive proposal that could
upset the consensus. The strength, skill, and discipline of that "escort"-its
ability to forestall or defeat any action, of whatever inherent merit, that
might damage its charge-will determine the outcome.
10 The conference has provided for negotiations in Plenary in which the president
would have the chairmen of the 3 main committees associated with him on the podium.
UN Doe. A/CONF.62/62, note 5 supra, para. 11(14).
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